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The use of mediation to resolve environmental disputes in 
South Africa and Switzerland  
 
A Introduction 
Mediation as one form of Alternative Dispute Resolutions (ADR) is 
nowadays recommended as an alternative to adversarial approaches, 
especially to expensive and time-consuming litigation, which until recently 
has been viewed as the only form of dispute resolution when legal 
procedures fail to settle a case or the parties involved fail to solve the 
problem on their own. Mediation procedures can be used prior to, in 
parallel with, or subsequent to conventional procedures and other 
instruments or can be linked to them. Mediation is not intended to replace 
the legal system. Mediation recognises that other values are also useful 
and postulates that society will benefit from the availability of less 
adversarial and more co-operative procedures.  
Until recently mediation has been used almost only in the field of 
labour law but new experiences with mediation in other fields of law, for 
example divorce law, has shown that mediation procedures have the 
ability to resolve disputes in almost every field of law. Since more then 3 
decades mediation is now also used, at least in some countries, to resolve 
environmental disputes. Nevertheless, a broader (world-wide) discussion 
and application of mediation in environmental disputes began only in the 
late 1980s and it still leads - except in the USA and Canada - only a 
shadowy existence in many countries. However, in many countries there 
has been a slow but ongoing introduction of these procedures since the 
start of the 1990s, and there are clear indications that this will continue to 
be the case. With help of this minor dissertation I want to examine how 
environmental mediation as a procedure to resolve environmental 
disputes is implemented in South Africa and Switzerland. 
The minor dissertation is structured as follows: After a short 
overview about mediation as one mechanism to resolve environmental 
disputes and the advantages respectively disadvantages of this kind of 
alternative dispute resolution, the focus shifts in paragraph C to the use of 
mediation to resolve environmental disputes in Switzerland. On the basis 
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of several cases in which mediation or mediation-type activities were used 
to resolve the environmental conflict I want to show why, in the end, 
environmental mediation probably will never be so widespread in 
Switzerland as it is in other countries. The paragraph ends with a case 
study about mediation experiences in Switzerland over nuclear waste 
disposal. Nevertheless, this aforementioned case study shows that the 
Swiss decision-making system offers a good basis for mediation 
procedures in areas of politics where there is yet little participation as 
longs as certain preconditions for a successful procedure are fulfilled. In 
paragraph D I deal with the use of mediation in South Africa to resolve 
environmental disputes. The focus shifts in a first step on the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA), especially Chapter 4 NEMA which 
deals with Alternative Dispute Resolution and, in particular, with 
environmental mediation. In a next step I examine if this Chapter has 
been already implemented or if there is still a big gap between theory and 
practice. Finally, paragraph D ends with two South African cases in which 
mediation was involved to resolve the dispute and a comparison of the 
two procedures. 
B Mediation as a process to resolve (environmental)  
disputes 
B.1 The beginning of mediation as a mechanism for environmental 
dispute resolution 
 
The use of mediation as an alternative instrument for settling 
environmental conflicts began in the United States of America in the early 
1970s although it had already been used in the 1960s to settle community 
and labour-management disputes. The initiative in the environmental 
sector was taken by Gerald W. Cormick and Jane E. McCarthy1 who 
successfully carried out a mediation project concerned with settling 
disputes over the planned construction of dams on the Snoqualmie River 
in Washington State. The first explicit effort to mediate an environmental 
dispute began in 1973, when Cormick and McCarthy initiated discussion 
with several parties to a flood-control and land-use planning conflict on 
                                                
1 Birkhoff & Lowry Whose Reality Counts 27, in: O’Leary & Bingham The Promise and Performance of 
Environmental Conflict Resolution (2003) RFF Press (USA). 
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the river. By the end of 1974 a written agreement was concluded between 
about a dozen parties involved in the conflict.2  
A broader (world-wide) discussion and application of mediation in 
environmental disputes began only in the late 1980s and, except in the 
USA and Canada,3 it is barely used. Nevertheless, in several countries 
there has been a slow but ongoing introduction of these procedures since 
the start of the 1990s, and there are clear indications that this will 
continue. 
B.2 Definition of environmental mediation 
 
Mediation is not easy to define; it does not provide a single analytical 
model which can be neatly described and distinguished from other 
decision-making processes.4 Gerald W. Cormick5, who pioneered the use 
of the mediation process in environment conflicts, defines mediation as: 
“A voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly 
explore and reconcile their differences. The mediator has no 
authority to impose a settlement. His or her strength lies in the 
ability to assist the parties in resolving their own differences. The 
mediated dispute is settled when the parties themselves reach what 
they consider to be a workable solution.” 
Another definition of mediation6 which includes definitions by other 
authors, states that: 
“Mediation introduces an outside neutral into the settlement 
process to act as a facilitator. Stullberg has provided the following 
explanation of mediation: The mediation process can be 
characterised as follows: It is (1) a non-compulsory procedure in 
which (2) an impartial, neutral party is invited or accepted by (3) 
parties to a dispute to help them (4) identify issues of mutual 
concern and (5) design solutions to these issues (6) which are 
acceptable to the parties. As with negotiation the only rules or 
                                                
2 Cormick & Patton Environmental Mediation: Defining the Process Through Experience 76 et sqq. in: 
Lake (editor) Environmental Mediation: The Search for Consensus (1980) Westview Press (USA). 
3 Therefore most of the literature used in this paragraph refers to the mediation of environmental 
disputes in North America. 
4 Boulle & Rycroft Mediation: Principle, Process and Practice (1997) Butterworths (South Africa) 
Chapter 1, 3. 
5 Weidner Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Conflicts: Experiences in 12 Countries 
(1998) sigma (Germany) at 16. 
6 Weidner, op cit note 5, at 16. 
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structures that apply are those imposed by the parties themselves. 
No objectively definitive norms or principles are assumed to control 
the outcome. As Fuller suggests, it is the settlement itself that 
creates the norm. And, like negotiation, the settlement requires the 
mutual agreement of the parties.”  
Seen in terms of negotiating, a central device in political theory and even 
more so in policy analysis, mediation can be defined as negotiation with 
the assistance of a trusted, independent and impartial third party whereas 
negotiation is defined as:7 
“A bargaining relationship between parties who have a perceived or 
actual conflict or interest. The participants voluntarily join in a 
temporary relationship designed to educate each other about their 
needs and interests, to exchange specific resources or to resolve 
one or more intangible issues such as the form the relationship will 
take in the future or the procedure by which problems are to be 
solved. Negotiation is a more intentional and structured dispute 
resolution process than informal discussion and problem-solving.” 
  
But mediation not only includes a third party as guardian of the procedure 
it also has to fulfil some basic prerequisites. These include the following 
minimum conditions:8 
a. “There must be recognition by all parties of the necessity of 
other parties participating in the process as coequals; that 
means some level of partnership between the parties has to 
be achieved. 
b. Each of the parties involved must have sufficient power of 
influence to sanction other parties’ abilities to take unilateral 
action. 
c. Participants should be able to commit themselves and their 
constituencies to implementing agreements reached in the 
negotiation process. 
d. Participants must have some sense of urgency with respect 
to settling the dispute.” 
                                                




It is one of the central responsibilities of the mediator to ensure that these 
basic conditions are fulfilled both before and during the procedure. That is 
why the success of an (environmental) mediation depends to a great part 
on the skills of the mediator. An experienced and well trained mediator is 
thus an important precondition for a successful mediation.  
B.3 Skills of an environmental mediator 
 
It is becoming clear that the environmental mediator needs special 
qualities and skills in order to be able to fulfil the role assigned to him or 
her in the mediation procedure. Although the ideal person will seldom be 
found, practice has nevertheless shown that there are sufficient people 
with a natural leaning to the job who at least adequately fulfil the 
requirements.9 But even the best mediator cannot ensure that the parties 
will reach a satisfactory resolution in every case; after all, success or 
failure is the ultimate responsibility of the disputants. A good mediator 
can contribute significantly to the chances for success, while a bad 
mediator can actually impede progress and cost the parties additional 
time and money.10  
The following criteria are usually given as the important characteristics 
of a mediator: neutrality/impartiality11 in relation to the issue of the 
conflict and the participating actors, independence of any interest groups 
relevant to the conflict (including those not taking part in the procedure) 
and communicative competence. They should be financially independent, 
so that they can objectively to judge their own suitability for particular 
cases. Mediators must be willing to turn down work and carefully assess 
each potential case prior to committing themselves to take over the task 
or to a particular design.12 In trying to select a good mediator, focus on 
impartiality/neutrality, process knowledge, confidentiality, substantive 
knowledge and experience, seems to me important.  
• Neutrality/Impartiality 
Neutrality refers to mediators’ prior knowledge about or interest in 
the outcome of disputes, and impartiality to the way in which they 
                                                
9 Ibid., at 18. 
10 Yarn Alternative Dispute Resolution: Practice and Procedure in Georgia Chapter 6, at paragraph 6-15 
11 See for the difference between neutrality and impartiality Boulle & Rycroft, op cit note 4, at 208-
210. 
12 Weidner, op cit note 5, at 19. 
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conduct the process and treat the parties. In these senses, 
neutrality is not an indispensable feature of mediation, whereas 
impartiality is.13 I therefore focus on the term of impartiality. 
Impartiality can be described as freedom from bias or favoritism 
and a lack of any interest in the outcome of the dispute.14 Granted 
that a mediator has no power to bind the parties or impose a 
decision, to that extent bias is not a considerable problem. A 
disputant can always walk out or ask the mediator to withdraw if he 
feels the mediator’s bias is harming the negotiations. But even the 
perception of bias can be harmful to the negotiations, so it is 
important to select a mediator whose impartiality is not questioned 
by either party.15 
 
• Confidentiality 
The duty to maintain confidentiality remains one of the most 
important ethical requirements of mediators.16 A mediator must 
maintain the reasonable expectations of confidentiality depending 
on the circumstances of the mediation and any agreements they 
make. The mediator shall not disclose any matter that a party 
expects to be confidential unless all parties give permission or 
unless required by law or other public policy.17 
 
• Process knowledge and experience 
Another important consideration is the mediator’s training and 
experience in the mediation process. Mediating may be an art, and 
some people may have an aptitude, but there is some essential 
craft that can and should be learned. Of course, actual mediation 
experience can make a big difference. Unfortunately, the relative 
newness of the process has produced very few experienced 
mediators.18 For some disputes, it may be helpful to have a 
                                                
13 Boulle & Rycroft, op cit note 4, at 208. 
14 Yarn, op cit note 10, at 6-15. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Boulle & Rycroft, op cit note 4, at 210. 
17 See Standards of conduct for mediators, in: Mediation: Sarah Christie Conciliation Module – Outline 
short loan reading list (Handout 10) 12 August 2004. 
18 Yarn, op cit note 10, at 6-15. 
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mediator with expertise in the subject matter in dispute.19 
Substantive expertise can be particularly helpful in a specialised 
area such as the environment. It is therefore advantageous to 
concentrate on finding a mediator with process knowledge, training, 
and experience over substantive knowledge. If a mediator with 
mediation expertise and subject matter expertise can not be found, 
I agree that the most critical mediation skills relate to the process, 
not the substance:  
“If you must choose, choose mediation expertise over subject 
matter expertise. An experienced mediator can be relied upon to 
assimilate rapidly the key technical and lega issues in even the 
most complex lawsuits.” 20 
 
• Further requirements 
Further requirements on the mediator vary with the kind of case; 
gender, age, race and cultural background.21 Thus, for example, it 
can be an advantage to have knowledge of political and 
administrative procedures or a high social reputation, authority or a 
persuasive nature. The appointment of a mediator with a high social 
reputation can be very helpful in certain disputes. For example, the 
appointment of former South African President, Nelson Rolihlahla 
Mandela, has given the Burundian Peace Process a major and much 
needed new lease on life.22 The world-wide high social reputation of 
Nelson Mandela was enough to bring the parties back together on 
the round table.  
Finally it is important that beside these general skills an environmental 
mediator at least has a basic understanding of environmental and 
environmental policy problems.23 
 
 
                                                
19 Riskin & Westbrook Dispute Resolution and Lawyers (1998) West Group (USA) at 183. 
20 Weidner, op cit note 5, at 19. 
21 Yarn, op cit note 10, at 6-15. 
22 Burundi Report February 2000, www.ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/burundi_reports/burrep-
feb2000.html (accessed on 30 July 2005). 
23 Weidner, op cit note 5, at 18. 
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B.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of mediation to resolve 
environmental disputes 
 
At first glance it is difficult to see why anyone would criticise the 
environmental dispute resolution approach. Why would anyone be against 
such desirable things as co-operation, communication and win-win 
solutions? Nevertheless, there are critics of this process. I discuss the 
advantages and the disadvantages of environmental dispute resolution in 
the following paragraphs. 
B.4.1 Advantages 
The increase in the use of mediation to resolve environmental disputes 
since the early 1970s may be attributed to a number of factors: 
First, the increase in the USA may be attributed to public 
dissatisfaction with the ability of the federal judicial system to handle 
environmental disputes. It has been argued that the failure of the judicial 
system to resolve environmental disputes in a timely fashion hurts all 
parties involved.24 With the increasing number of cases, delays are 
inevitable. In environmental cases delay can be costly. Delays may also 
be harmful to environmental interest groups, if they are not established, 
well-funded entities.25 Thus the argument is made that mediation is 
superior to litigation because it is much faster and, consequently, the 
problems caused by delay can be avoided. The parties do not have to wait 
months (or years) for a trial date; they can meet with the mediator 
almost immediately. Cases that have been in litigation for a long time are 
often resolved relatively quickly once the parties turn to mediation. For 
example the dispute over the Snoqualmie River Dam26 had been in the 
court system for seventeen years before being resolved through eight 
months of mediation.27 
Second, consensual approaches to resolving environmental conflict 
are often superior to litigation because of the lower process costs of 
mediation compared to litigation. Exact figures are difficult to estimate, 
but one author conservatively estimated that, complex mediation cases 
                                                
24 Williams ‘Consensual approaches to resolving public policy disputes’ Journal Dispute Resolution 
(2000) at 144. 
25 Kubasek & Silverman ‘Environmental Mediation’ 26 American Business Law Journal (1988) at 540. 
26 See on the whole case Lake, op cit note 2, at 85 et sqq. 
27 Kubasek & Silverman, op cit note 25, at 540. 
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could run into thousands of dollars, but complex lawsuits could cost 
millions.28 
Third the litigation process itself may be inappropriate for handling 
environmental disputes. The courts are primarily designed to resolve 
disputes between two parties; environmental disputes often affect more 
than two parties and are retrospective in their focus. Having a greater 
number of parties at the mediation table is also seen as being desirable 
because it maximises benefits and minimises costs. Each party is seeking 
a solution that gives the greatest gains to its interests at the least cost.29 
Presumably each party will also attempt to achieve these gains at the 
lowest cost to others as well, because if the costs to others are too high 
they will not voluntarily pay these costs, and mediation requires a 
voluntary agreement. Thus, the process will focus on maximising total 
benefits for all and minimising collective costs.30 As long as many tribunals 
do not have a own department with specialists which deal with 
environmental disputes litigation may be, with regard to costs and time, 
inappropriate for environmental disputes. 
Fourth, many commentators contend that consensual processes are 
preferable to litigation when resolving environmental disputes because the 
use of an adversarial process of litigation is often counterproductive. An 
adversarial process, which usually fosters hostility between the 
disputants, is troublesome in environmental disputes because, after the 
litigation ends, the parties are required to coexist peacefully.31 Mediation, 
on the other hand, can often serve an educational function. It educates 
the parties as to the other disputants’ positions, thereby improving the 
relationship between the parties and perhaps reducing the likelihood or 
magnitude of future disputes. It also increases the potential to develop 
compromise solutions acceptable to all participants.32 Conflicts are bound 
to occur in the future and the negative feelings engendered by the 
litigation process will make it more difficult for the parties to resolve 
future disputes.33 
                                                
28 Ibid., at 541. 
29 Ibid., at 543. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Williams, op cit note 24, at 145. 
32 Kubasek & Silverman, op cit note 25, at 545. 
33 Ibid., at 546. 
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Another particular advantage of mediation is that, unlike 
conventional instruments, which often produce win/lose solutions, it can 
produce solutions in which everybody wins (win-win solutions).34 The 
efforts of the mediator are directed toward a compromise that will satisfy 
some of the desires of each of the parties.35 Both parties tend to feel that 
they received something. Thus, they are more likely to perceive the 
outcome as fair, abide by the agreement and mediate future 
misunderstandings.36 Because the agreement was voluntary, and they 
helped formulate it, they feel more committed to making it work and 
because the parties feel that they may have gained something from the 
agreement, they are more likely to abide by it in order to preserve their 
gains.37 Contrary to mediation, a lawsuit requires a winner and a loser. 
The emphasis focuses on winning and because of the often public nature 
of the controversy, the parties may be less willing to compromise, even if 
a compromise might resolve the case.38 Furthermore, parties may have 
confidential information that they would be reluctant to reveal to an 
adversary. They might be more willing to share the material in confidence 
with the mediator, with this disclosure facilitating a settlement.39 
B.4.2 Disadvantages 
Critics of mediate environmental disputes point out a number of 
weaknesses. The fundamental criticisms can be summarised as follows: 
First, many environmental statutes expressly require elaborate 
procedural safeguards because speedy and final resolution of 
environmental problems may not always be in society’s best interest.40 At 
times disputes involve such highly charged issues and potentially 
devastating effects to health and the environment that there is no room 
for compromise.41 For example the establishment of a disposal site 
involves such potentially effects. Thus, in both countries, South Africa and 
                                                
34 Susskind & Cruikshank ‘Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes’ 
(1987) Basic Books (USA) at 11; Fisher/Ury/Patton ‘Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In’ (1991) Random House (USA). 
35 Kubasek & Silverman, op cit note 25, at 546. 
36 Williams, op cit note 24, at 145. 
37 Kubasek & Silverman, op cit note 25, at 546. 
38 Ibid., at 550. 
39 Phillips & Piazza ‘The Role of Mediation in Public Interest Disputes’ Hastings Law Journal (1983) at 
1234. 
40 Schoenbrod ‘Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev.(1983) at 1453. 
41 Tompkins ‘Mediation, the Mediator, and the Environment’ 11 Nat. Resources & Environment (1996) 
at 68.  
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Switzerland, the establishment of any disposal site is prohibited by law42 
and only allowed under certain conditions and by permission of the 
government. 
Second, some cases may be just too important to mediate. In such 
cases only through a lawsuit a legal precedent can be established or an 
interpretation of a statute can be obtained.43   
A third problem which may arise in mediating environmental 
disputes is that there is a greater potential for no uniform outcomes 
among similar proposals44 which can lead to the destabilisation of the 
legal certainty in the country. When cases are litigated, judges rely on 
precedent and attempt to apply the law uniformly to similarly situated 
parties. The outcome of each mediation is a creative and often novel 
resolution and parties are not bound by precedent. Arguably, this 
potential for widely disparate outcomes is or could become unfair.45 This 
disparity of outcomes may in turn lead to an erosion of regulatory rules. 
Parties who do not like certain regulations may try to achieve a mediated 
settlement whereby they avoid the direct application of the rule.  
A fourth potential problem with mediating environmental disputes is 
the possibility that not all interested parties are prepared to become 
involved in the resolution process. Thus, a significant problem is the lack 
of joinder mechanism available in litigation. The voluntary nature of 
mediation means that it is only binding on the participants and therefore 
lacks a regulatory dimension. For a successful and recognised mediation 
process it is therefore necessary to identify and involve all affected and 
interested parties. Otherwise there is always the risk that parties who are 
not participants in the mediation process will file suit. This inability of the 
mediator to force parties to the mediation table may have several adverse 
consequences. First, when the parties who have the authority to 
implement an agreement are present at the mediation table, the chances 
of reaching a successful agreement are significantly increased. Thus, if 
those with the authority to make settlements cannot be forced to the 
bargaining table respectively are not perceived as the legitimate 
                                                
42 Section 20 (1) of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 and section 9 (1) Umweltschutzgesetz. 
43 Schoenbrod, op cit note 40, at 1468. 




spokesperson for the opposing view, the chances of success declines.46 
The refusal of the United States and Israel, for example, to recognise the 
PLO as the legitimate bargaining agent for Palestinians and the 
corresponding refusal of the PLO to recognise Israel stood for years in the 
way of peace talks in the Middle East.47  
A fifth problem with mediating environmental disputes arises when 
an issue of great significance needs resolution. Settlement reached 
through mediation does not establish judicial precedent. In addition, a 
consensual settlement is not subject to judicial review.48 Furthermore, 
troubling issues of confidentiality may arise when environmental issues 
affecting the public interest are resolved behind closed doors.49 
A final concern with mediating environmental disputes involves a 
potential imbalance of power. If not each of the parties involved in the 
mediation process have sufficient power of influence to sanction others 
abilities to take unilateral action, litigation may protect the interests of the 
parties in a better way.50  
 
C The Use of mediation to resolve environmental 
disputes in Switzerland 
C.1 Mediation in Switzerland 
 
The Swiss political culture stresses consent. It follows that 
negotiated solutions and consensus-building mechanisms are widespread. 
The State, which is relatively weak at its centre, because of extensive 
decentralisation, the cantonal system and a large degree of direct 
democracy in form of referendum politics, is obliged to adopt an inclusive 
strategy vis-à-vis its opponents.51 Therefore, the central government 
needs to develop strategies for involving opponents at a local and 
                                                
46 Ibid., at 550. 
47 Moore, The mediation Process Practical Strategies for resolving conflicts (2003) Jossey-Bass (USA) 
189. 
48 Schoenbrod, op cit note 40, at 1457.  
49 Tompkins, op cit note 41, at 68; confidentiality is one of the hallmarks of mediation, but this aspect 
of mediation that makes it an attractive alternative to costly litigation may clash with the idea of 
public participation found in most environmental statutes and regulations. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Waelti, Swiss Mediation Experiences over nuclear Waste Disposal, in: Weidner (ed) Alternative 




cantonal level from the very outset. Decisions are normally re-negotiated 
and modified at a federal, cantonal and local level in order to adapt them 
to special local policy needs.52 
Knoepfel53 describes the following five types of conflict resolution 
mechanisms as the most important within the Swiss political and 
administrative system:  
a) The resolution of conflicts through parliamentary motions or 
referendums54 
In Switzerland a vote is taken when consensus is not achieved 
following lengthy negotiations. The principle of majority rule 
through parliamentary and/or direct democracy provides a solution 
for many disputes in Switzerland.  
The area of environmental policy is no exception and there are 
numerous examples in this area. For example, the result of a legally 
required referendum, forced the authorities within a canton to let 
the citizens decide the most environmentally friendly incineration 
technology. This meant that a very long drawn out dispute among 
experts was solved over a short weekend in June 1993, when the 
people voted for a new refusal incineration plant of the 
“thermoselect company.”55  
In another case following slow-moving negotiations, a 
coalition of environmental groups and political parties, mainly from 
mountain cantons, initiated 1990 a referendum with regard to the 
acceptability of transit on alpine roads. The aim of this referendum 
was to reduce the transit traffic on the alpine roads within the next 
10 years by shifting the majority of the transit traffic on the rail 
network. In 1993 the Federal Assembly decided to make no 
counterproposal56 against this referendum and to recommend the 
                                                
52 Environmental Mediation in Europe-Status and Experiences; Procedures for Resolving Environmental 
and Water Management (2000) (Austria: Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Environment and Water Management, Department of EU Affairs) 56. 
53 Knoepfel, The Wide Range of Negotiation Forms Used in the Resolution of Conflicts in Switzerland, 
in: Weidner (ed) Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Conflicts: Experiences in 12 
Countries (1998) sigma (Germany), at 274 et sqq.. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Parlamentarische Initiative Kehrichtverbrennungsanlage (KVA) des Kantons Tessin 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2003/8025.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2005) 
56 Section 139 (5) of the Constitution provides that the Federal Assembly recommend the electorate to 
accept or to reject the initiative. In case it recommend the electorate to reject the initiative the 
federal assembly has the freedom to make counterproposal. 
 
 16 
electorate the rejection of the initiative. On 20 February 1994 the 
electorate voted with 52% for the shift of the transit traffic on the 
rail network.57 
In this case (and numerous other cases), processes of more 
or less intensive negotiations were abruptly broken off and resolved 
by the citizens through referendum.58  
b) Decision by a judge59 
The administrative court procedure which is to speak the standard 
procedure used in the resolution of environmental conflicts in the 
Federal Republic of Germany is less common in Switzerland. This is 
due, on the one hand, to the fact that in contrast to the Basic Law 
(constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany,60 the Swiss legal 
system does not recognize any general clause providing for legal 
protection through the Administrative Courts.61 In accordance with 
Article 97 ff. of the Federal Act of December 1983 on the 
organization of federal justice administration (OG-Bundesgesetz 
über die Organisation der Bundesrechtspflege), certain important 
decisions which are of significance for environmental law cannot be 
accessed through administrative court procedures. In these cases, 
legal disputes must be resolved by the Federal Council. This was for 
example the case in the highly controversial appeal against the 
authorisation granted for a second high-voltage cable across the 
Gemmi Pass which was ultimately decided by the Swiss Department 
of Justice and the Police and not by the Administrative Court.62 
c) Co-operative solutions63 
The implementation of the Swiss Environmental Protection Act of 7 
October 1983 (USG-Bundesgesetz über den Umweltschutz) and the 
numerous decrees issued by the cantons in terms of that Act has 
led to unpredictable informal administrative decisions in the area of 
redeveloping former waste disposal sites. In most cantons, a formal 
                                                
57 CH Politik 1990-2001 http://www.anneepolitique.ch/docu/CHPolitik1990-2001.pdf (accessed on 14 
August 2005). 
58 Knoepfel, op cit 53, at 275. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Article 19 (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
61 Environmental Mediation in Europe, op cit note 52, at 57; Knoepfel, op cit note 53, at 275. 
62 Article 99 of the Organisation Act. 
63 Knoepfel, op cit note 53, at 276. 
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redevelopment procedure as prescribed in Article 16 of the Act has 
yet to be established. The sole provision in the redevelopment 
procedure is that the industrial and commercial concerns must 
submit redevelopment proposals to the cantonal authorities by a 
specified deadline. These proposals can generally be clarified to the 
satisfaction of the authorities and plant operators in the course of 
negotiations. There have been few instances whereby definitive 
orders for individual and special redevelopment measures have 
been opposed and rejected by operators. 
d) Professionalisation and standardization64 
Some environmental conflicts, which as recently as a few years 
ago, would have been dealt with through long drawn out processes, 
can now be dealt with considerably greater ease due to the fact 
that a common language for conflict has been developed. This 
means that misunderstandings which used to occur regularly, can 
now be resolved relatively speedily. This development can be 
explained on the one hand by the standardization of pollution 
quality standards and on the other hand by the ecological 
professionalisation of personnel at the national environmental 
protection agencies, environmental organizations and the 
representatives of industry and commerce. Finally, a 
professionalized service in the areas of the culture of dispute and 
conflict regulation technologies has been established recently.65 
e) Avoidance of conflict 
If all conflicts in Switzerland were solved through negotiations, 
ballots, legal proceedings, cooperation or the professionalisation of 
personnel, Switzerland would not exist. On the contrary, 
Switzerland, with all its conflicts, has survived very precisely 
because all of the Swiss authorities from the local to the federal 
have developed a variety of strategies to avoid taking unilateral 
decisions on controversial matters.66 It would appear that it is easier 
to live with the – all too familiar – implementation deficits in some 
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well-known cantons, with the more or less familiar translation 
errors in German, Italian and French legal texts and with the open 
or concealed federal illegalities in the administrative practices of 
one or another canton, than to pursue relentlessly and at any price 
a solution for every individual conflict.67 The nudge and the wink, 
the alleged “oversight”, or a positively ingenious application of the 
perspective limited to arbitrary cases68 by federal authorities and the 
federal legal system can be viewed as the instruments of this kind 
of conflict avoidance strategy. 
 
The Swiss have made very little use of mediation to resolve 
environmental disputes.69 However, if one adopts a wide definition of 
mediation it can be seen that the political-administrative system includes 
a wealth of institutionalised procedures of consent-building at all levels. 
Therefore, it is difficult to identify mediation solutions in the strict sense 
and to distinguish them clearly from the other instruments used in 
Switzerland to reach consensus .70  
For all these reasons, Knoepfel71 even goes as far as to say that 
there is not much need for mediators in Switzerland because its entire 
political and administrative culture and institutions are suffused with 
numerous negotiation elements. In his opinion, for the present and the 
immediate future, the value of mediation processes will remain negligible 
because, despite extensive potential for conflict - which in comparison to 
other countries is also a fundamental aspect of Swiss life - the national 
and cantonal authorities provide for forms of negotiation in a more or less 
regulated form. He continues that in most instances there is no need for a 
mediator as a neutral, negotiating person who helps in the resolution of 
environmental conflicts. He even thinks that in many cases such an 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 Article 4 of the Swiss constitution provides the so called “restricted perspective of arbitrariness”. 
This means that an appeal in front of the Federal Court against a decision of a cantonal 
administrative court is only possible if the applicant can proof that the decision of the cantonal 
Administrative Court was arbitrary. Thus the restricted perspective of arbitrariness offers the 
Federal Court a wide administrative discretion and another instrument for the avoidance of 
conflicts. 
69 Cavigelli, The Working Party on Reprocessing in the Swiss Conflict Resolution Procedure on 
Radioactive Waste, in Weidner (ed) Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Conflicts: 
Experiences in 12 Countries (1998) sigma (Germany), at 299. 
70 Environmental Mediation in Europe, op cit note 52, at 56. 
71 Knoepfel, op cit note 53, at 277. 
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institution would probably face rejection, as it would be interpreted as a 
confession by the traditional and new institutions, and also the major 
parties to the conflict, of their inability to reach an independent resolution 
of their disputes. Third party intervention could be seen as undermining 
those with authority to make decision or reach consensus and therefore 
the intervention would be seen as intrusion rather than assistance. 
Knoepfel’s statement that the parties involved usually engage in 
direct negotiations without any third party needs to be qualified.72 He, 
himself, and Sonja Waelti report on procedures that have included a 
neutral third party.73 
Waelti also does not share Knoepfel’s general opinion that 
Switzerland does not need environmental mediation.74 On the contrary, 
she thinks that the Swiss decision-making system offers a good basis for 
mediation procedures, especially in areas of politics where there is yet 
little participation, for example the non-governmental implementation of 
political decisions.75 In her opinion the Swiss decision-making process, with 
its manifold options for vetoes and interventions, could be improved by 
mediation in terms of duration and efficiency if a kind of round table with 
a stable basis was established for early-phase negotiations involving also 
individuals persons and groups without links to formal procedures and 
informal committees, which much influence the decision-making process 
in Switzerland.76  
In now examine different cases in Switzerland, which included 
mediation, or a similar procedure in different fields. Most of these 
processes cannot be described as mediation in the strict sense, but they 
are in my opinion important to offer the reader a better understanding of 
the Swiss political culture where negotiated solutions and other forms of 
consensus-building mechanisms are already widespread. Furthermore, 
most of these processes are comparable with mediation as they involve a 
                                                
72 Environmental Mediation in Europe, op cit note 52, at 57. 
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neutral third party functioning as a moderator or an independent project 
manager in some form.77 
 
C.2 Processes in Switzerland which involve Mediation or 
Mediation-type Activities 
 
The conflict resolution processes presented here all focus directly or 
indirectly on the area of environmental policy. The specific sectors 
involved include waste management, energy, nature conservation and 
transport.  
C.2.1 Waste 
This section includes two sample cases from the large number of 
ongoing and completed conflict management processes surrounding the 
designation of locations for waste management facilities in Switzerland. 
Each of the two cases involved hazardous waste treatment plants which, 
under Article 30 (3) of the Swiss Environmental Protection Act, must be 
constructed on Swiss soil as the export of hazardous waste is now entirely 
prohibited.78 The controversy surrounding the construction of such plants 
is not solely concerned with the choice of environmentally friendly 
technology for the plants. Due to additional pollution effects caused by the 
operation of such plants (increased traffic, impact on the countryside, 
etc.), the choice of the actual sites for the construction of plants using 
non-controversial technology generally also gives rise to other conflicts. 
There is no need to emphasize the fact that in such cases local minorities 
often have to endure disproportionate disadvantages so that the service in 
question can be provided for the majority. Thus, in general it can be said 
that the affected minority is not automatically prepared to make this 
sacrifice.79 
C.2.1.1 The Licensing Procedure for the CIBA-GEIGY Hazardous Waste 
Incineration Plant in Basle-Town80 
 
In this first case, which started in summer 1985 and came to a 
successful conclusion in May 1991, well-known Swiss pharmaceutical 
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companies faced opposition from eleven groups. The groups came from 
the immediate locality of the proposed site for the plant,81 neighbouring 
Germany,82 the canton of Basle-Town83 and all over Switzerland.84 In 
addition to the Co-ordinating Office for Environmental Protection of the 
Canton of Basle Town, which was responsible for the allocation of the 
license, the authorities involved also included the Director of the Basle 
Town Building and Construction Department and the Basle-Town 
Administrative Court.85 The supporters of the plant included the Swiss 
Commission for Waste Management, the Federal Office for the 
Environment, Forests and Landscape and the neighbouring canton of 
Basle-County, which expressed interest in using the facility for the 
incineration of its own hazardous waste. Finally, several more or less 
neutral ecology departments were also involved in this process. It was one 
of these neutral ecology departments, which suggested an alternative 
procedure to resolve the existing conflict.86 
Following bitter open conflict between one of the pharmaceutical 
company and its opponents, particularly the Germans, who repeatedly 
raised the issue of dioxins, an agreement was reached on this highly 
controversial issue. This was ultimately possible because following the 
initial negotiations with its opponents (against the difficult background of 
an chemical incident in November 1986, in which one of the 
pharmaceutical companies was involved) the pharmaceutical companies 
set the highest possible technological standards for the plant, and began 
to conceive the project not merely as a company project but as a regional 
project and hence a public service. In my opinion this change from profit-
driven to public service must be seen in connection with the bad 
reputation of the pharmaceutical company among the population caused 
by the chemical incident in November 1986. The opponents finally 
withdrew their Administrative Court appeal when a written agreement had 
                                                
81 Aktion Selbstschutz (Self-Protection Action Group) and Gruppe Sondermüllofen-Gegner (SMOG) 
[Opponents of the hazardous waste incinerator]. 
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(Regierungspraesidium), SPD Baden-Württemberg. 
83 World-wide Fund for Nature (WFN) Basle Section, Social Democratic Party of the Canton of Basle-
Town. 
84 WFN Switzerland, Democratic Jurists [Demokratische Juristen]. 
85 See Knoepfel, op cit note 53, at 262. 
86 Ibid., at 261. 
 
 22 
been signed between them and the pharmaceutical companies. In this 
agreement, the pharmaceutical company undertook to observe more 
stringent quality standards for particulate matters and different exhaust 
emissions than those prescribed in the federal and cantonal legislation. It 
was also agreed to implement permanent monitoring of air pollutant 
emissions. The environmental organisations were involved in the 
observation of the quality standards.87 Although no actual mediator 
emerged in the course of this process, the director of the Co-ordinating 
Office for Environmental Protection of the Canton of Basle Town, who held 
intensive individual and round table discussions with the various partners 
in the conflict, and finally succeeded in getting the participants to 
compromise, did play a key role in the process.88 
C.2.1.2 Designation of a Site for a Landfill for Incinerated Residual Waste in the 
Canton of Aargau 
 
The designation of a site for a landfill for incinerated residual waste 
in the canton of Aargau took place from the end of 1992 to the end of 
1993.89 27 of the 32 sites originally proposed were eliminated in the first 
two stages of the procedure. The procedure then continued by 
institutionalising a so called “democratic co-operation process” among the 
local authorities in the areas where sites were still under consideration. 
These groups were established by a team of experts from the Technical 
University of Zurich, which also acted as supervisor.90 For a period of six 
months, 80 residents from the affected areas, divided into four 
commissions, worked on an evaluation of the sites. Their work resulted in 
a recommendation for the further processing of the projected sites to a 
delegation of officials, which consisted of representatives from the state 
administration under the direction of the cantonal minister for public 
works.91  
This process also did not use mediation in the strict sense of the 
word. The project director provided specialist supervision on the side of 
the canton, and the Technical University project group were responsible 
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for the implementation of the consensus-building process without itself 
taking on the role of neutral mediator. This form of alternative dispute 
resolution could be best described as political dialogue supported by 
project management.92 
C.2.2 The Energy Sector: Upgrading of the Major “Cl euson/Dixence Hydro-
electric Station” in the Canton of Valais 93 
The following process concerns the use of hydro-electric power, 
which is the primary source of electricity production in Switzerland. In this 
case the company implementing the project94 had the support of the 
canton where the hydro-electric station was situated but faced strong 
opposition from WFN (World-wide Fund for Nature).95  
On 4 November 1992, the environmental protection organisations 
signed an out-of-court settlement prior to the termination of appeal 
proceedings at the Federal Court. In the out-of-court settlement, the 
environmental organisations undertook not to exercise their right of 
appeal against the planned increase in the station’s operating capacity for 
the generation of electricity to meet peak-time demand96. In return, the 
project company and the canton undertook to provide several services for 
the benefit of the public, including: 
• the securing of undetermined water through exclusion of various 
streams from the power station water system;  
• the creation of an ecological compensation area in the valley floor, 
and its designation as a nature conservation zone with the 
involvement of an equal representation commission;  
• study of the effects of construction work and operation of the power 
station on the Rhone water system  
• and the creation of biotope zones in different areas. 97 
In this instance, the institutional pressure in the form of the 
imminent Federal Court judgement, the outcome of which neither side 
could comfortably predict, lead the involved parties to a negotiated 
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solution in the aforementioned form. Thus, in this case there was no need 
for actual mediators to invite the parties to meet at the negotiation table.98 
Unfortunately this kind of institutional pressure plays still a marginal role 
in Switzerland and the parties still prefer to resolve environmental 
disputes by court decisions, even though the outcome of such decisions 
are almost always unpredictable. 
C.2.3 Nature Conservation 
In 1987, the Swiss parliament passed a revision of the 1966 
Federal Act on the Conservation of Nature and Protection of Habitats 
(NHG-Bundesgesetz über den Schutz von Natur und Heimat). This Act 
provides a legal basis for implementing the protection of biotopes through 
the passing of the relevant inventories (Article 18a).99 In accordance with 
the provisions of this Act, the Federal Council passed three decrees: one 
on the protection of raised bogs and carrs100 of national importance, 
another decree about the introduction of regulations on the protection of 
lowland moors of national importance, and a further decree on the 
protection of moor landscapes of exceptional beauty and national 
importance. As a result of the implementation of these decrees, a total 
area of 1126 km2 is to be protected through special measures to be 
implemented by the cantons.101  
This amount of protective federal legislation led to the emergence 
of an opposing faction in the affected cantons because the affected 
cantons felt limited in their right of self determination. In 1992 and 1993, 
the opposition took the form of five initiatives in the respectively affected 
cantons, which led the relevant National Council commission to pass a 
motion demanding the mitigation of the absolute protection of the 
moorlands provided under the revision of the relevant article of the 
constitution.102 The affected cantons protested against what, in their 
opinion, were too generously drawn-up perimeters103 for the designated 
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nature reserves and against the extreme limitation of land uses in these 
areas.  
This protest led the Federal Office for the Environment, Forests and 
Landscape to join forces with the Swiss tourism organization and to 
establish a working group. This working group aimed to bring together the 
different interests in the areas of landscape and moorland conservation, 
tourism and agriculture.104 A survey by the Federal Office for the 
Environment, Forests and Landscape and the farmers’ association, which 
was carried out with regard to the care and maintenance of moorlands 
and the resulting loss of income for agriculture, identified annual costs of 
around 28 million Swiss francs. A legal basis for the compensation of 90 
per cent of losses in the agrarian sector was finally established under the 
terms of the revision of the Federal Act on the Conservation of Nature and 
Protection of Habitats.105  
As in the controversial case of the crop rotation plots, 106 the cantons 
perceived the one-sided definition of the protective boundary provided by 
officials of the Federal Government as a genuine insult. They were not 
prepared to accept the conservation requirements, which were becoming 
more and more restrictive, and the federal inventory, which in many 
instances impinged on their territory. Thus, in the course of 1993, official 
representatives of the Swiss nature conservation and countryside 
protection authorities had to face various sessions at which they found 
themselves the target of wild accusations from the cantonal regional 
development, financial, and even the nature conservation authorities. 
Approximately 90 protected objects were discussed during these 
meetings, and in most cases the relevant (geographical) boundaries were 
adjusted in favour of the cantons, or the land use regulations were 
relaxed somewhat. 107  
C.2.4 Transport 
In 1979 the Swiss deputies passed a motion arising from a petition 
by environmental protection activists in the canton of Valais, demanding 
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the redesign or reduction of the motorway from central Valais to northern 
Valais.108 On the basis of this motion the Federal Office for Road 
Construction nominated a Professor from the Technical University in 
Lausanne to examine the layout of the motorway. The mandate included a 
study of the general layout and capacity, the number of motorway feeders 
and the links between the new road and the cantonal road network. In 
addition, part of this study was also to analyze current and future 
transport requirements and the effects of the work on the environment, 
landscape, agriculture and tourism, road safety and the cantonal 
economy.109  
Without any knowledge of the instrument of mediation the 
professor subdivided the controversial stretch of motorway from central 
Valais to northern Valais into eight partial stretches which he then re-
evaluated one by one on the basis of an repeated process. He then 
formed regional citizens groups with representatives of the various 
interested groups (offices of the cantonal administrations, farmers, 
environmental protection organizations) and the local authorities for each 
partial stretch of motorway. These groups started by developing different 
variants, which were subjected to a technical feasibility study.110 The 
following step involved the evaluation of the variants by regional groups. 
The three variants with the best results were finally used as a basis for 
planning drawings produced locally by members of the professor’s team 
and then evaluated again by the regional groups.  
The professor’s approach resulted in achieving significant 
improvements in the layout of the road, which with one exception were 
accepted by the opposition. As a result of this, most of the proposals 
developed by the professor were passed under the standard planning 
permission procedure without difficulty. This procedure comes probably 
closest to environmental mediation in the strict sense.111 
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On the basis of the aforementioned fields in which environmental 
mediation or a similar procedure has been applied in Switzerland, one can 
say that environmental mediation has gained further ground in recent 
years. Nevertheless, environmental mediation in the strict sense remains 
well known only to several experts in Switzerland while public awareness 
is still low.112 This limited knowledge of environmental mediation exists in 
Switzerland because parties involved in an environmental dispute have 
numerous other options for advocating their interests in environmental 
policy planning and measures.113  
This shadowy existence of environmental mediation in Switzerland 
points to a risk that arises when environmental mediation is applied in 
Switzerland. It is the risk that inadequately trained moderators organize 
and chair the mediations, so that the idea of mediation as a whole might 
be discredited for the parties involved.114 This problem has been identified 
and several universities and academies now offer education on mediation 
and environmental mediation.115 Only the future will show if trained 
mediators will help to promote mediation in Switzerland to resolve 
environmental disputes. 
C.3 Case Study 
 
In this section I want to complement the overview in section C.2 with a 
specific case in respect of the “mediation experiences” in Switzerland over 
nuclear waste disposal. It is important to highlight at this point that the 
procedures discussed in this section were never officially called mediation, 
although the procedure chosen at central government level and at the 
proposed site does exhibit most of the features of a mediation 
procedure.116 
C.3.1 Overview 
I have chosen this field for my case study for the following reason: In 
Switzerland, the disposal of nuclear waste has been delegated to the 
National Association for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (NAGRA-
                                                






Nationale Genossenschaft für die Lagerung radioaktiver Abfälle), which is 
in fact a semi-private organization. This delegation of the responsibility for 
implementation to a parastatal institution makes procedural integration of 
the potential opposition impossible.117 Thus, the normally common 
negotiation and consensus mechanism does basically not take place.118 In 
contrast to the authorities which incorporate competing interests directly 
into the planning process, parastatal organizations do so only when forced 
by increased pressure from outside to do so.119  
The National Association for the Storage of Radioactive Waste was 
founded in 1972 by the national authorities, electricity companies and 
nuclear power station operators. In March 1982 the association published 
a list of possible sites for the ultimate disposal of low and medium level 
radioactive waste.120 In a referendum in 1990 the Swiss decided to place a 
moratorium on construction of new nuclear power plants. This decision 
marked an about-turn in national policy on energy and waste disposal.121 
Based on this decision and on the energy clause in the Swiss 
Federal Constitution, the “Energy 2000” plan of action was launched in 
early 1991 by the Federal department of traffic and energy (EVED-
Eidgenössisches Verkehrs- und Energiedepartement). One of the many 
elements in this programme was the federal government’s efforts to 
soften the hardened fronts in the question of radioactive waste disposal by 
engaging the different groups (energy industry, environmental 
organizations, central government, cantons and local authorities) in 
dialogue.122  
In summer 1993, the National Association for the Storage of 
Radioactive Waste announced its choice for an underground final disposal 
facility for low and medium grade radioactive nuclear waste of the 4 
existing nuclear power station of Switzerland. Shortly afterwards, it 
submitted an application for a framework license to build the disposal 
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facility at Wellenberg, a mountain in the canton of Nidwalden.123 Permission 
was granted by the national authorities. The Federal Council’s decision to 
award framework authorization was to have been submitted to the Swiss 
parliament, and this was to have been followed by further authorization 
procedures at cantonal and local authority level, as required by the federal 
political system of Switzerland.124 The choice of a site brought a new 
dynamic into the nuclear waste disposal conflict and on the basis of the 
aforementioned changed climate surrounding energy policy, effort were 
made to initiate mediation not only at central government level but also at 
the proposed site of the planned disposal facility.  
C.3.2 The significant parties to the conflict 
Two reasons led a large number of parties being involved in the 
disposal conflict. The first reason is the federal structure of the political 
decision-making process in Switzerland. The second reason is its 
parastatal implementation.125 The environmental organizations and the 
authorities that were involved were represented by different actors at 
different levels. The environmental organizations at central government 
level included the Swiss Energy Association (SES-Schweizerische 
Energiestiftung) and Greenpeace while at cantonal level cantonal 
environmental and civil rights groups were involved. Finally, at local level 
local opposition took the form of fairly loosely structured pressure groups. 
Contacts between the groups at different levels were in general sporadic 
and informal.126 The formation of the state parties also varied from level to 
level. At central government level, the Federal Agency for Energy 
Management127 and the control organs were directly involved in the dispute 
whilst at the cantonal level it was the government which was the main 
actor. At local level it was the local council which represented the interests 
of the local authorities. Compared to the environmental organizations and 
the authorities, NAGRA as the operator of the planned nuclear waste 
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disposal presented, at all three different levels, the only constant 
participant.128  
C.3.3 Mediation efforts at central government level  
C.3.3.1 Preparing the first conference on disposal and how it progressed 
 
The central government commissioned collaboration between the 
environmental organizations and the Federal Agency for Energy 
Management by organizing the first conference on disposal in 1991. The 
parties decided to hold a one-and-a-half-day conference to discuss 
different topics, including: a waste inventory and the form of the waste, 
plans for the disposal of nuclear waste and the safety of final disposal 
facilities. Meanwhile the question of the imminent selection of a site and 
the questions of general energy policy were explicitly excluded from the 
agenda.129 This exclusion was on the one hand very important because the 
positions of the parties with regard to this question were so far away from 
each other that a mediation process on this topic was impossible. On the 
other hand it was highly controversial to separate the more value-driven 
energy policy from the mediation process. It cannot be expected that such 
a fundamental value conflict can be eliminated in a mediation process 
about the disposal of nuclear waste. 
The four groups of participants: the operators, authorities, 
environmental organizations and specialists, were asked to submit a list of 
potential participants. The groups agreed that the disposal conference 
would be private and confidential to facilitate the free exchange of ideas in 
a risk-free environment. The aim of this first conference was to identify 
relevant topics and differing points of view. Those topics on which there 
was agreement would be handled first, the remaining areas of conflict 
would then be dealt by the committee, the so-called conflict resolution 
group on radioactive waste, which was elected by the participants of the 
first disposal conference.130  
The first disposal conference was held in November 1991. The 
participants were, apart from the rapporteur and the chair131, almost 30 
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people. The conference was divided in three sessions. In the first session, 
the primary subject under debate was reprocessing. The participants 
identified several issues on which there were different opinions but agreed 
that the question of reprocessing did contain enough scope for negotiation 
to make a joint approach possible. It was decided to hold a scenario 
analysis session and to organize a joint fact-finding trip to a reprocessing 
plant in England.132  
The second session dealt with the question of whether a final 
disposal solution for nuclear waste was preferable to a long-term interim 
storage solution.133 The participants agreed that permanent isolation of the 
waste from the biosphere using geological disposal facilities is the best 
solution but the environmental organizations wanted direct monitoring 
and complete retrieval of the waste to be guaranteed for as long as 
possible. The session ended in a heated dispute on the question of what 
constituted a good site.134  
The discussion in the third session, on the safety of final disposal 
facilities, was also quite conflictual and there was a certain undercurrent 
of aggression. This was especially the case when it came to questions of 
reprocessing and siting.  
The participants in this first disposal conference then elected a 
committee, the so-called conflict resolution group on radioactive waste, 
composed of a representative from each of the parties along with the 
“mediator”. The committee consisted of seven people. Two 
representatives from the environmental organizations, two 
representatives from the operators, two representatives from the 
authorities and a scientist from a nuclear energy research body. Its 
functions were to work on controversial topics and to prepare further 




                                                
132 Waelti, op cit note 51, at 285. 
133 A long-term interim storage solution means that nuclear waste is stored over an undefined period 
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standards are much higher, is yet not established in Switzerland. 
134 Waelti, op cit note 51, at 286. 
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C.3.3.2 The work of the Conflict Resolution Group 
 
Among all the topics, which had arisen during the disposal 
conference the Conflict Resolution Group on radioactive waste first set up 
a working party to look at the question of reprocessing. The function of 
this working party was to undertake a literature study and draw up a list 
of criteria for decision making. The other topics were deferred to a later 
date.136  
In summer 1992 the Conflict Resolution Group on radioactive waste 
established another working party. The function of this new group was to 
look at final disposal with long-term interim storage and to compare 
surface disposal with underground disposal.  
The working party on reprocessing held ten one-day meetings 
between March and December 1992. Overall, there was a good, co-
operative working atmosphere among the members of the working party. 
There was also some degree of understanding on certain controversial 
issues.137 The working party on reprocessing was the only one to continue 
working within the framework of the conflict resolution group on 
radioactive waste. A joint final report on reprocessing was prepared and 
given to the individual actors for review and ratification. However, the 
report was in the end never approved by the Conflict Resolution Group on 
radioactive waste, since shortly afterwards, the environmental 
organizations withdrew from the group, after the central government 
granted permission for the expansion of a nuclear power station (the 
Federal Council authorized an increase in the capacity of one of the 
nuclear power station), which resulted in the collapse of the whole waste 
disposal procedure.138  
The second working party on disposal techniques was only able to 
hold a constituting meeting in December 1992 before talks were broken 
off.139 The need for the safe disposal of radioactive waste was not disputed 
by anyone, but the ’s decision destroyed the trust of the environmental 
organizations. Furthermore, waste disposal policy not only met with 
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strong resistance from environmental organizations but also from the local 
authorities and affected cantons. 
C.3.3.3 Chairing of the Discussion, Mediator 
 
Professor Jakob Nuesch acted at the disposal conference and in the 
Conflict Resolution Group on radioactive waste as mediator. Although he 
has no specific expertise in the field of nuclear waste disposal, he is a 
microbiologist and was able to follow the scientific debate and was 
accepted without discussion by all the participating parties. During the 
disposal conference, he played the role of discussion facilitator and 
intervened only to give the floor to different speakers and to make the link 
from one session to the next. In Waelti’s view he fulfilled his function as a 
mediator in a very low-key, but competent manner.140  
The mediator’s lack of special expertise on the subject and 
experience as a mediator was not a negative factor during the disposal 
conference, even though he did show some uncertainty in recognizing 
lines of conflict at various points in proceedings. He played a similar 
function within the Conflict Resolution Group on radioactive waste but he 
functioned more actively as mediator than in the disposal conference. He 
acted not only as chairman and facilitator but also held caucuses with the 
individual parties and organized small discussion groups. Thanks to his 
competent manner it was possible repeatedly to resolve the conflict over 
the controversial participation141 of a specific environmental organization 
(Greenpeace).142 However, in the end mediation efforts at central 
government level failed and it raises the question why.  
C.3.3.4 Reasons for the failure of the national mediation procedure 
 
A generally accepted prerequisite for successful mediation is that all 
participants involved in the conflict believe that the process and the 
outcome could be beneficial to them. This condition was only partially 
fulfilled. Both representatives of the operators had no hopes of gaining 
anything from the procedure while the environmental organizations mainly 
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hoped that their point of view would gain greater importance during the 
discussions and the authorities hoped primarily for improved 
communication. None of the parties feared that the procedure would place 
them at a greater disadvantage. The main concern of both the 
environmental organizations and the operators was that the procedure 
would be inconclusive and therefore a waste of time.143 Since it was not to 
be expected that fundamental value conflicts with regard to energy policy 
in Switzerland would be eliminated, a willingness to negotiate on certain 
aspects of the conflict, entailing not a shift in the position but a balancing 
of interests, would have been necessary for a successful outcome.144 In my 
opinion many of the participants did not want to be the spoilsports in the 
procedure and thus anticipated in the mediation process. But the mediator 
also missed the opportunity during the procedure to reassure the 
participants that the process was at risk and to explain the disadvantages 
of a failure of the process. 
However, Waelti145 identified the following three main reasons for 
the failure of the national attempt at mediation to resolve the dispute over 
the disposal question: 
1) “The form and the aims of the mediation procedure were not 
defined with sufficient clarity and consensus. 
2) The procedure proved to contain insufficient scope for negotiation, 
which prevented the demands and concessions from being 
packaged. 
3) The failure was due to a lack of pressure to succeed, at a decisive 
stage in the conflict most parties found the “exit” the more 
comfortable option in many ways, at any rate preferable to sitting 
down at the negotiating table to try and resolve the dispute.” 
One reason, which can be highlighted, clearly is the failure to define 
the ground rules and aims of the procedure. A clear formulation of goals 
for the procedure was never drawn up. Most likely the participants feared 
that such a definition of ground rules and aims of the procedure would led 
to deadlock before the mediation process had even begun. Therefore the 
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goals were defined differently from party to party and ranged from 
“talking to one another” or “breaking down stereotypes” to relatively 
concrete implantation goals, such as abandoning reprocessing completely. 
The missing of a common formulation of goals led to heated discussion 
throughout the whole procedure.146  
Another reason for the failure was that nuclear waste disposal 
policy offered insufficient scope for negotiation with regard to the already 
advanced stage of the decision making process. At the time of the talks, 
unofficially at least, the site had already been selected. In the end one can 
say that the failure of the procedure makes it clear that for some of the 
parties unilateral action promised a greater chance to push through their 
interests.147 Especially the government manifested with its decision to 
expand the nuclear power plant, before the talks had even begun, that 
they see a real chance in unilateralism to solve the dispute. Looked at in 
terms of the parties BATNA’s (Best Alternatives to a Negotiated 
Agreement),148 the resignation of the environmental organizations would at 
first sight seem to indicate that, following the state’s decision to expand 
the nuclear power plant, they considered their chances of success to be 
better outside the co-operative procedure than at the round table.149 The 
behavior of the government during the mediation process leads to an 
opposite conclusion. The decision of the government in the middle of the 
mediation process to increase output at a nuclear power station leads to 
the conclusion that they had fallen below their BATNA, otherwise there is 
no explanation for this “breach of trust”. At this stage of the procedure it 
was probably only the NAGRA which did not fall below their BATNA since 
what this organization fears the most is the ongoing mobilization and 
uncertainty resulting from public referendums.150 
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C.3.4 The Mediation Procedure at the Proposed Site (Wellenberg) 
 
The government of the canton planned to locate a nuclear disposal facility. 
But this met with vehement resistance from its population. As the federal 
political system of Switzerland requires authorization procedures for a 
nuclear disposal facility not only at central government level but also at 
cantonal and local authority level the Government of the canton sought to 
increase public participation hoping to mitigate this fierce opposition. For 
this purpose it set up in the summer of 1994 the Wellenberg Working 
Party.  
The working party not only included experts but also the political 
parties, interest groups and the local authority for where the disposal 
facility was to be sited. All members of the group were in at least indirect 
relationship to the canton.151 This working party was given the remit of 
drafting the cantonal government’s statement on the framework license 
application and of supervising the granting of the various cantonal licenses 
necessary for the construction permit.152 The members of the working 
party appointed as mediator the chairman of the board of the Swiss 
Association of Accident Insurers (Schweizerische Unfallversicherungs-
anstalt), who also lives in the canton. Due to his political impartiality, his 
specialist knowledge in the field of radiation protection and his status of 
an outsider he was accepted by all parties.153  
Although the government of the canton retained ultimate political 
responsibility, the working party had a far-reaching advisory capacity and 
decided for itself which topics and which aspects of the disposal facility 
question it wanted to discuss. It decided to meet monthly and agreed that 
the meetings would not be public. At the close of each meeting the 
agenda for the following meeting was drawn up by the mediator and 
discussed and approved. The working party also agreed to speak with one 
voice when publishing its comments and results and undertook to 
maintain strict confidentiality.154  
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The working party reported to the Government of the canton at the 
beginning of 1995. The report recommended that the Government should 
approve the framework license application and grant the various cantonal 
licenses subject to certain conditions. In particular, the report 
recommended that cantonal residents have a say155 in determining the 
contents156 of the disposal facility. Furthermore, it called for a quality 
assurance plan to be drawn up and that the question of siting the disposal 
facility deeper in the ground be examined and a comparison made 
between the options submitted. 157 
Although the representatives of opponents to the facility did not 
agree with the way the cantonal licenses should be granted,158 the report of 
the Wellenberg working party presented a consensual opinion. However, 
the people of the affected canton made use of their political rights and 
legally required referendum. In June 1995 the vote about the situation of 
the nuclear disposal facility in their canton took place. In a close decision, 
52 per cent of the electorate rejected both the opinion of the cantonal 
government and the granting of licenses.159  
Even though in the end the residents of the canton themselves 
decided against the proposed site in their canton the procedure lead for 
the first time to a joint statement160 with regard to a nuclear disposal 
facility. On the other hand the procedure at central government level161 did 
end in a breakdown in talks and the report on reprocessing was even 
never formally approved within the conflict resolution group. In the next 
paragraph I therefore examine why the two procedures had such different 
outcomes. 
C.3.5 A comparison of the two procedures 
 
One reason for the different outcomes of the two procedures is that 
the mediation-like processes occurred at different stages. The procedure 
at central government level took place within the framework of the Energy 
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Peace162 and was intended to help create a consensus on energy policy. 
The primary functions of the discussion in the disposal conference, and 
then later in the conflict resolution groups, was to formulate policy, and as 
such they were initiated at far too late a stage.163 This was also one 
important reason why many of the participants thought the discussions 
pointless. The mediation efforts at the proposed sites, on the other hand, 
were part of the process implementing nuclear waste disposal policy and 
began at a time when NAGRA was already gaining ground, but when all 
options were still, at least theoretically, open.164 
Another reason can be seen in the behaviour of the involved parties 
with regard to the agreed confidentiality. In both procedures it was 
decided that the disposal conference would be confidential. This 
agreement was kept by the parties in the Wellenberg process in which the 
working parties spoke with one voice when publishing its comments on 
results. In the other procedure there must have been a breach of trust 
among the participants after the central government granted permission 
for the expansion of a nuclear power station in the middle of the talks. 
A further reason for the different outcomes of the two mediation 
procedures can be identified in the decentralised structure of the Swiss 
political system, which causes problems when siting decisions are taken at 
central government level. The unilateralism of central government with 
regard to the selection of the proposed site was therefore at odds with the 
socio-political nature of Swiss society. Most of all since the issue in 
contention is appropriate to influence the feeling of safety and security of 
the people. 
One can say that nuclear waste disposal policy shows that the 
system deals more effectively with challenges, which are brought 
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 Based on the decision of the Swiss electorate in 1990 to place a ten-year moratorium on 
construction of new power plants and on the energy clause in the Swiss Federal Constitution the 
“Energy 2000” plan of action was launched in early 1991. Apart from quantitative prescriptions 
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modelled on the Swiss “labour peace”, which aims to bring the energy industry, environmental 
organisations, central government, cantons and local authorities together around the negotiating 
table. It calls for the use of conflict resolution groups in the problem areas of hydroelectric 
power, electrical transmission wires and nuclear waste disposal.  




vertically165 than with those brought horizontally.166 Whilst the vertical 
conflicts between national and local or cantonal authorities require 
decision-makers to make substantial concessions during the planning 
process, the horizontal conflicts in waste disposal policy mainly lead to 
blocks to the procedure, without the environmental organisations gaining 
any substantive concessions from them.167 For instance, it proved possible 
to smooth out the differences between the federal government and the 
cantonal and local authorities by informally including the latter, whereas 
the conflicts between the federal authorities and the environmental 
organisations intensified. By manoeuvring the environmental 
organisations out of the process, they focused their energy on opposition 
campaigns and mobilising their local members. In the end one can say 
that the breakdown in talks paid dividends to the environmental 
organisations and the acceptation of the referendum strengthened their 
position.168 Thus, the influence of the environmental organisations on the 
result of voting’s with regard to energy policy and waste disposal has been 
underestimated by the federal authorities. 
Both the procedure at federal level and at the potential site do 
possess, even if only to a small extent, new elements differing from the 
traditional extra-parliamentary and advisory committees in Switzerland. 
Still, the question if the Swiss political and administrative culture does not 
already have a wide variety of other mechanisms for conflict resolution 
which strongly qualifies the purpose and potential value of mediation 
procedures remains. This comment by Knoepfel169 is probably true for 
areas of politics where a strong participatory structure is already in place 
such as for example in the aforementioned areas of nature conservation170 
and transport.171  
Nevertheless, I agree with Waelti172 that the Swiss decision making 
system offers a good basis for mediation procedures in those areas of 
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politics where there is little participation. In particular the field of 
parastatal implementation contains a potential for mediations procedures, 
which should not be underestimated. One reason is that private 
corporations have the option of greater flexibility in dealing with them 
than the authorities, that are bound by clear legislation regulating 
implementation. The authorities are prohibited from making substantive 
concessions in order to break the impasses. To choose such a co-
operative approach in form of mediation requires incentives. Such an 
incentive can be seen in the Swiss executive process173, with its multiple 
opportunities for intervention and veto and the consequential loss of time 
and concomitant decrease in efficiency. But this would require round table 
talks to be organised on a more stable basis. Mediation procedures in 
which, the administration plays the role not of mediator but of one of the 
parties to the conflict, could help to bring about this kind of stabilisation. 
However, the mediation procedures would have to begin at an early 
stage; otherwise many of the participants will always fear that such 
processes are pointless because ‘too little, too late’.174 
C.3.6 Recommendations and prospects for the future 
Below, I analyse the two procedures I have described to determine 
the prerequisites of a successful environmental mediation and the 
prospects for establishing well managed processes in the future. 
C.3.6.1 Preconditions for a successful procedure 
 
• The subject of the negotiation is a conflict of interest, not a conflict 
of values 
Probably the most important element necessary to reach a successful 
resolution is that the conflict is amenable to mediation. A balance of 
interests must be possible in an objective respect. Furthermore it is a 
determining factor that the object of conflict does not include basic 
(ethical) principles between the parties.175 The parties involved in the 
mediation efforts at the proposed site knew that the question of 
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general energy policy represented a conflict of deep-seated values and 
as they were aware in advance that they were unlikely to reach 
consensus on this conflict and compromise would leave all sides 
dissatisfied they decided that the broad policy issues were left off the 
agenda.176 The intention was to discuss a waste inventory and the form 
of the waste, plans for the disposal of nuclear waste and the safety of 
final disposal facilities, in order to separate these questions from the 
more value-driven energy policy, which includes the pursuit of nuclear 
energy production.177 This approach was laudable but the failure to 
define the ground rules and aims of the procedure created an 
undercurrent of aggression during the disposal conference of 1991, 
and it soon became clear that the environmental organizations had 
agreed only with great reluctance to exclude the question of general 
energy policy from this conference.178 Meanwhile the subject of the 
negotiation in the mediation procedure at the proposed site was 
obviously a conflict of interest since the existence of nuclear waste is 
just a matter of fact and cannot be denied by any of the parties. No 
one disputes the fact that there is a genuine need to dispose somehow 
the waste that had already been produced and would continue to be 
produced. All participants indicated a preference to store the nuclear 
waste of the Swiss nuclear power station in a safe place somewhere in 
Switzerland than to export it to other countries where the storage of 
the nuclear waste cannot be monitored at all.  
 
• Will to mediate and participation is voluntary 
In the mediation procedure at central government level the main 
parties to the conflict were evidently not ready to compromise. As 
already mentioned, both representatives of the operators voiced the 
opinion that they had had no hopes of gaining anything from the 
procedure. The environmental organizations were also very skeptical. 
And the central government did not make a great effort to 
compromise, otherwise it would not have approved an increase in 
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output from a already existing nuclear power station in the middle of 
the procedure (December 1992).179 Furthermore participation was not 
entirely voluntary. The operators felt obliged to take part because they 
did not want to upset the environmentalists and the authority seemed, 
at least in the beginning, to have difficulty finding anyone motivated to 
take part.180 In the mediation procedure at the proposed site, on the 
other hand, there existed a clear will to reach a compromise. This will 
to compromise led to a consensual opinion of the working party in its 
report. All the members of the working party agreed with the 
conditions laid down in the report. Participation was in this procedure 
entirely voluntary and the fact that all the members of the group were 
in at least indirect relationship to the canton seemed to have a positive 
effect on the commitment of the parties to the process.  
 
• The mediator is impartial and credible for all 
This condition was met but both of the mediators were not trained in 
mediation. The mediation process may have been more successful if 
the mediator had been trained to draw out the important issues in the 
conflict. Skilled mediators would have also had more flexibility in 
identifying or creating scope for negotiation.181 
 
• There is a willingness on all sides to respect the agreed rules 
In the mediation procedure at the proposed site the working party had 
set clear rules for its monthly meetings, including to draw up, discuss 
and approve the agenda for the following meeting. Furthermore it had 
set itself the goal of reaching decisions and drafting reports in the 
course of a consensual process.182 In contrast, in the mediation 
procedure at the central government level there were hardly any 
agreed rules. It seems that it was rather a loose facilitation than a 
structured engagement managed by the mediator. Nevertheless, the 
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behaviour of the participants was considered by most people to be 
appropriate.183 
 
• Confidentiality of the process 
A successful mediation depends also on the fact that information in 
connection with the mediation process is confidential and not 
accessible to others without consent of the parties. Without the sure 
knowledge that everything said during the hearing or during a “caucus” 
will remain private, mediation would not work because the parties 
would not feel free to explore honestly all aspects of their dispute and 
possible avenues to settlement. But sometimes it is possible that so-
called data conflicts block a mediation process. The most common data 
problems are lack of information, misinformation, and discrepancies in 
data the parties believe are relevant do deciding the issues. In such 
situations mediators have to find a way to generate movement by 
encouraging information sharing among the parties. However, there is 
no duty of the mediator greater than the duty to preserve the 
confidentiality of everything revealed to him during the hearing or 
during a caucus. Such an information sharing with help of the mediator 
is therefore only possible with permission of the affected parties.. 184  
In the mediation procedures at the proposed site and at the central 
government level the confidentiality of the processes was granted.185  
 
• There is sufficient negotiating power 
An environmental mediation can only be successful if the participants 
have the power to negotiate. This means that the parties must have 
more or less the same potential of threat and the same potential of 
change. If the conflict involves a substantial imbalance of power, 
mediation is probably not the right way to solve the dispute. 
Furthermore the procedure of mediation is not suitable for conflicts, 
which involve a large number of parties. 186 In both of the procedures 
there was, at least with regard to political power, no obvious imbalance 
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of power. Both the environmental organisations and the operators 
possess political power. The political power of the environmental 
organisations lies for example in the mobilisation of membership, in 
organising blockades and in press and electoral campaigns. However, 
the political weight of the operators is greater. That has to do with 
their influential links to political and administrative institutions, which 
can to some extent be attributed to existing power structures. For 
example, several members of the federal and cantonal governments 
are on the board of directors of the Association of the Swiss power 
stations.187 However, as we saw in the mediation procedure at the 
proposed site, the operators should never estimate the political power 
of the environmental organisations to influence the outcome of a 
voting since nuclear energy policy and the question of disposal of 
nuclear waste remain two of the most controversial issues in 
Switzerland.  
C.3.6.2 Prospects for the Future 
 
Even though one mediation procedure soon ended in a breakdown 
in talks and the promising result of the other was rejected in a 
referendum, one can say that these procedures probably ended in a kind 
of restart with regard to environmental mediation in Switzerland, and 
created the necessary conditions for the start of a new round of talks, in 
which energy policy and the question of waste disposal could be discussed 
together.188  
One of the most important things with regard to future mediation 
procedures in the field of nuclear waste disposal or energy policy in 
general is that such a procedure would have to begin at an early stage 
and not when one participant has already, even if unofficially, come to a 
decision.189  
However, another important feature of future procedures is that 
they are facilitated by an experienced and well-trained mediator, who has 
the necessary mediation skills to guide the discussion towards the decisive 
points. Furthermore, the mediator and the participants also have to place 
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far greater emphasis on a clear definition of the aims and the ground-
rules for the procedure in advance.  
Finally, it would be important to prevent the repetition of the same 
mistakes. Unfortunately the involved parties missed the opportunity to 
debrief and reflect honestly on what went wrong and what went right 
during the two procedures. An evaluative research project accompanying 
the procedure could help to avoid the same mistakes and could also clarify 
the limitations and potential of new conflict management procedures of 
this kind.190  
The question how these consensus-seeking procedures can survive 
if the opportunity for referendum can act as a veto remains. Nevertheless, 
in my opinion a successful mediation procedure in which all affected and 
influential parties are involved can avoid a referendum or, at least, 
influence the outcome of a referendum. 
In the end all of the involved parties should bear in mind that the 
need for the safe disposal of radioactive is not disputed by anyone. Thus, 
the highly controversial discussion between authorities, environmental 
organizations and operators about the general energy policy in 
Switzerland needs to be resolved in order to avoid the permanent risk of 
an incident in connection with the already produced nuclear waste, stored 
at the moment in interim storage somewhere in Switzerland. 
 
D The Use of mediation to resolve environmental 
disputes in South Africa 
D.1 Environmental Mediation in South Africa 
 
On the African continent it is South Africa, which has experienced the 
most extensive development and use of formal mediation process.191 In 
1968, the Centre for Intergroup Studies192 was founded to create 
cooperative, creative and constructive approaches to resolving conflicts.193 
By the late 1970’s the statutory dispute resolution mechanism in South 
Africa were largely discredited as ineffective apartheid institutions, and 
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employers and employees came together to establish a private dispute 
resolution body to mediate and arbitrate labour disputes.194 The 
Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA) was finally 
established in 1984.195 IMSSA trained mediators and arbitrators and made 
their services available to employers and employees.196 
The success of mediation in the area of labour conflict led to an 
expansion into the spheres of racial and political conflict. In respect of the 
dramatic changes following the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, 
mediation became not only acceptable, but indeed quite popular and has 
moved beyond the labour field.197 Since then mediation has been used by 
many organizations198, international agencies, the state and political parties 
(in particular the African National Congress and the Inkatha Party) to 
resolve disputes, especially political conflicts.  
Through the National Peace Accord (NPA), activate during the 
period from 1991 until 1994, mediation was introduced at grassroots level 
to solve inter- and intra-community conflicts. Alongside the NPA’s official 
process, a mediation industry developed in South Africa, bringing along 
national and international practitioners, training packages and people to 
be trained and re-trained in the art of mediating conflict.199  
However, until 1998 there was no established tradition of 
environmental mediation discernible in South Africa. Environmental 
mediation as a dispute resolution process was at that time not really in 
use in South Africa, even though some disputes were already successfully 
mediated (for example the “Saldanha Steel”200 dispute was resolved by 
negotiation).201  
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At the end of the 1990s, the only statute in South Africa with 
general environmental dispute resolution implications was the 
Environment Conservation Act 79 of 1989. This Act, within the context of 
the Constitution, which was adopted in 1996 and entered into force 3 
February 1997, formed the framework within which environmental dispute 
resolution operated in South Africa.202 The aim of this Act is, inter alia, to 
enable the Minister to manage environmental affairs as well as possible 
and a considerable emphasis is placed on centralised, top-down decision-
making and management in which the executive plays the most important 
role. The Act aims to provide the Minister with quality information so that 
he is able to make well-informed decisions on how to manage 
environmental problems.203  
However, this kind of executive management is not a dispute 
resolution process in the strict sense because the parties in conflict have 
no control over either the process or the result.204 Section 15 of the 
Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 also envisages a so-called 
Board of Investigation. According to that provision the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism may appoint an ad hoc Board of 
Investigation when the need arises. However, the Environment 
Conservation Act expressly states that the Board is merely to assist the 
Minister in the evaluation of any matter or appeal.205 Thus, the Board has 
no legal decision-making power and cannot properly be regarded as a 
dispute resolution method in the strict sense.206 To sum up one can say 
that until recently, litigation has been the traditional method of resolving 
environmental disputes.  
The final 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No 
108 of 1996) and in particular the fundamental environmental rights 
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granted by s 24 read with s 38 of the Bill of Rights are set to lead to an 
increase in constitutional litigation about environmental disputes. 
However, in environmental disputes litigation is seldom the optimal 
resolution of conflict since litigation is always expansive and slow, 
generally destructive of the relationship between the parties and ends 
normally in win-lose situations for the parties.207 Until the end of 1998 
environmental mediation in South Africa was neither encouraged nor 
forbidden by any statutory instruments. 
Knowing that mediation holds particular potential in environmental 
disputes where typically a disparate number of parties have a varied and 
divergent interest in a particular issue208 it became obvious that facilitation 
and encouragement of environmental mediation as a process was what 
was needed from the legislature at that time.209 The legislature realized a 
need for alternative dispute resolution to resolve environmental disputes 
in South Africa. It therefore took this method of dispute resolution into 
account when it decided to supersede the Environment Conservation Act 
73 of 1989 by the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
which repeals some but not all of the provisions of the Environment 
Conservation Act.210 In the following paragraphs I examine the impact of 
the National Environmental Management Act on environmental mediation 
in South Africa. 
D.2 National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
 
D.2.1 The History of NEMA 
The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 is regarded as a 
milestone statute in environmental affairs in South Africa. Not only was 
pioneering work done with regard to the democratic and negotiated policy 
and legislative processes that preceded it, but NEMA is also the first 
umbrella national legislation which endeavours to establish an integrated 
environment management framework which will transform and co-
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ordinate most of the currently diverse and fragmented sectors of the 
environment.211  
NEMA’s origins can be found in the environmental policy 
development process. This process is known as the Consultative National 
Environmental Policy Process (CONNEPP) and was launched in August 
1995 at a national conference in which about 500 representatives took 
part. Less than a year later, in April 1996, a discussion document was 
released and six months later the Green Paper on an Environmental Policy 
for South Africa was released.212 Between late October 1996 and 16 
December 1996 the general public was given the opportunity to comment 
on these documents. In January 1997 a second conference was held and 
on 28 July 1997 a draft White Paper on Environmental Management Policy 
for South Africa was published. Comments were invited from the general 
public to be submitted before end of August 1997.213 The final White Paper 
on Environmental Management Policy for South Africa was released on 15 
May 1998. This White Paper, which was the outcome of an extensive 
public participation process, laid the foundation for NEMA.214  
The draft National Environmental Management Bill was finally 
published on 1 July 1998, calling for comment by 28 July of the same 
month. The very next day on 29 July 1998 the Cabinet approved the Bill. 
It was passed in the National Assembly on 21 September and, while it was 
being debated in parliament several public hearings were being held. 
These were hosted by provincial environmental portfolio committees to 
prepare representations for the National Council of Province’s (NCOP)215 
consideration of the Bill. While noting a few minor amendments, the NCOP 
approved the Bill shortly afterwards.216 The National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998, was finally passed by the National 
Assembly on 5 November 1998, and came into force in January 1999.217  
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D.2.2 NEMA and its scope  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No 108 of 1996) 
contains the right to the environment as a fundamental right. This means 
that the executive acts of government and national legislation must 
consistent with this right. The Constitution provides that everyone has a 
fundamental right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-
being and that government must by legislative and other measures 
protect the environment by preventing pollution, promoting conservation 
and sustainable development, while building the economy and society.218  
Apart from the Constitution there exist many other laws, which protect 
the environment, for example, nature conservation laws, water laws, air 
pollution laws and the recently enacted NEMA. NEMA is designed to 
enhance protection of environmental rights. It does so by creating a 
number of environmental principles to guide government action.219  
However, as NEMA entered into force on 29 January 1999 it can 
only be used for problems that are about to happen or that happened 
after 29 January 1999. It does not help to solve problems, which started 
before this date unless the problem is continuing.220  
The National Environmental Management Act is made up of 10 
Chapters. A discussion of the effect of NEMA on the environmental law in 
South Africa is far beyond the ambit of this article, and the focus of this 
paper will be on Chapter 4 since it provides a basis for alternative dispute 
resolution procedures, particularly mediation procedures which are 
necessary in environmental conflict.221 
D.2.3 Chapter 4 NEMA: Alternative Dispute Resolutio n  
The dispute resolution provisions in the NEMA are set out in 
Chapter 4: Fair Decision-Making and Conflict Management. It, refers to 
four different dispute resolution procedures: facilitation, 
mediation/conciliation, arbitration and investigation. Although Chapter 4 
refers to all four aforementioned procedures, it is focused on mediation.222 
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The relevant provisions can broadly be divided into two types of 
measures: Those which attempt to resolve environmental conflicts 
between different tiers of government, and those that provide for a form 
of dispute resolution mechanism between private parties and 
government.223 
D.2.3.1 The relevant provisions 
 
Section 17 provides as follows: 
Reference to conciliation 
(1) Any Minister, MEC224 or Municipal Council- 
(a) where a difference or disagreement arises concerning 
the exercise of any of its functions which may 
significantly affect the environment, or 
(b) before whom an appeal arising from a difference or 
disagreement regarding the protection of the 
environment is brought under any Law, 
may, before reaching a decision, consider the desirability of first referring the 
matter to conciliation and- 
(i) must if he, she or it considers conciliation appropriate either 
(aa) refer the matter to the Director-General for conciliation 
under this Act; or 
(bb) appoint a conciliator on the conditions, including time-
limits, that he, she or it may determine; or 
(cc) where a conciliation or mediation process is provided for 
under any other relevant law administered by such Minister, 
MEC or Municipal Council, refer to the matter for mediation or 
conciliation under such other law; or 
(ii) if he, she or it considers conciliation inappropriate or if 
conciliation has failed, make a decision: Provided that the 
provisions of section 4 of the Development Facilitation Act, 
1995 (Act 67 of 1995), shall prevail in respect of decisions in 
terms of that Act and laws contemplated in subsection 1(c) 
thereof. 
(2) Anyone may request the Minister, a MEC or Municipal 
Council to appoint a facilitator to call and conduct meetings 
of interested and affected parties with the purpose of 
reaching agreement to refer a difference or disagreement to 
conciliation in terms of this Act, and the Minister, MEC or 
Municipal Council may, subject to section 22, appoint a 
facilitator and determine the manner in which the facilitator 
must carry out his or her tasks, including time limits. 
(3) A court or tribunal hearing a dispute regarding the 
protection of the environment may order the parties to 
submit the dispute to a conciliator appointed by the 
Director-General in terms of this Act and suspend the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the conciliation. 
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Section 17 (1)(a) of NEMA provides for the resolution of inter-
governmental conflicts by empowering any Minister, MEC or municipal 
council to refer to conciliation a dispute or disagreement concerning any of 
its functions which may significantly affect the environment. The statute 
does not designate a specific conciliator because the referrer can in terms 
of s 17 (1)(b) refer the dispute to the Director-General, a conciliator or, 
where the mediation is subject to another law, to the mediator or 
conciliator provided in such other law.225 A similar provision regulates the 
resolution of conflicts between government and private parties (see s 17 
(2)). Under this subsection anyone may request the Minister, a MEC, or 
municipal council to appoint a facilitator to call and conduct meetings of 
interested and affected parties with the aim of reaching agreement to 
refer a difference or disagreement to conciliation.226 As Glazewski points 
out, s 17(2) does not stipulate what matters can be referred to this 
procedure; it does not in particular refer to differences or disagreements 
arising out of the application of this or other particular acts, so one can 
assume that any kind of disputes can be brought under this section’s 
umbrella.227 Finally subsection (3) of section 17 provides that disputes 
regarding the protection of the environment before a court or tribunal 
may be referred to a conciliator appointed by the Director-General in 
terms of this Act.228 
Section 18 details the manner of conciliation and procedures for 
conciliation. It provides for the appointment of a mediator, as well as the 
kind in which the mediator should resolve the environmental dispute.229 
The wording of section 18 is the following: 
Conciliation 
(1) Where a matter has been referred to conciliation in terms of 
this Act, the Director-General may, on the conditions, 
including time-limits, that he or she may determine, appoint 
a conciliator acceptable to the parties to assist in resolving a 
difference or disagreement: Provided that if the parties to 
the difference or disagreement do not reach agreement on 
the person to be appointed, the Director-General may 
appoint a person who has adequate experience in or 
knowledge of conciliation of environmental disputes. 
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(2) A conciliator appointed in terms of this Act must attempt to 
resolve the matter- 
(a) by obtaining such information whether 
documentary or oral as is relevant to the resolution 
of the difference or disagreement; 
(b) by mediating the difference or disagreement; 
(c) by making recommendations to the parties to the 
difference or disagreement; or 
(d) in any other manner that he or she considers 
appropriate. 
(3) In carrying out his or her functions, a conciliator appointed 
in terms of this Act must take into account the principles 
contained in section 2. 
(4) A conciliator may keep or cause to be kept, whether in 
writing or by mechanical or electronic means, a permanent 
record of all or part of the proceedings relating to the 
conciliation of a matter. 
(5) Where such record has been kept, any member of the public 
may obtain a readable copy of the record upon payment of a 
fee as approved by Treasury. 
(6) Where conciliation does not resolve the matter, a conciliator 
may enquire of the parties whether they wish to refer the 
matter to arbitration and may with their concurrence 
endavour to draft terms of reference for such arbitration. 
(7)  
 
(a) The conciliator must submit a report to the 
Director-General, the parties and the person who 
referred the matter for conciliation, setting out the 
result of his or her conciliation, and indicating 
whether or not an agreement has been reached. 
(b) In the event of no agreement having been reached, 
the report may contain his or her recommendations 
and reasons therefore. 
(c) Where relevant, the report must contain the 
conciliator’s comments on the conduct of the 
parties. 
(d) The report and any agreement reached as a result 
of the conciliation must available for inspection by 
the public and any member of the public may 
obtain a copy thereof upon payment of a fee as 
approved by Treasury. 
(8) The Director-General may from time to time with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance, appoint persons or 
organizations with relevant knowledge or expertise to 
provide conciliation and mediation services. 
 
Chapter 4 also contains provisions for arbitration230 and for directing a 
more detailed investigation.231 Arbitration is governed by the Arbitration 
Act232 and in terms of the Commissions Act233 the Minister can confer the 
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powers of a Commission of Inquiry on a person or persons into order to 
undertake a more detailed investigation.234  
D.2.3.2 Chapter 4: Nice theory or relevant practice? 
 
I was impressed when I read Chapter 4 for the first time. It is quite 
remarkable, with regard to my Swiss background where environmental 
mediation is not implemented in the legislation, how the South African 
legislator recognised that mediation and other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution could be an efficient way to resolve environmental disputes. It 
is worth noting that any Minister, MEC or Municipal Council may refer an 
environmental matter to mediation and a court or tribunal hearing an 
environmental dispute may suspend the proceedings and order the parties 
to attempt to settle by way of mediation. These procedures could 
definitely result in a decrease of (environmental) litigation and lead to an 
increase of environmental mediation. Furthermore the legislation provides 
that anyone, including the affected parties, may request the 
aforementioned representatives to appoint a facilitator with the purpose of 
reaching agreement to refer a difference or disagreement to conciliation in 
terms of this Act.235  
It is obvious that the legislator intended to promote mediation and 
the other forms of alternative dispute resolution to resolve environmental 
disputes in South Africa. The legislator made also a significant contribution 
to environmental dispute resolution by authorising the funding of 
environmental mediators in appropriate cases. So it is indisputable that it 
was one of the main focuses of the legislator to promote alternative 
dispute resolution, and in particular mediation, to resolve environmental 
disputes in South Africa.  
It was therefore a great disappointment when I found out during 
my research, after approaching the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (DEAT) for information about the implementation of Chapter 
4, that the national office of DEAT has not yet processed one successful 
case using any of the alternative dispute mechanisms provided for in 
Chapter 4. According to its Email the DEAT stated the following: “The 
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national office of DEAT has not yet processed a case using alternative 
dispute mechanism as mentioned in Chapter 4. We are still working on an 
implementation plan for this chapter and will then hopefully proceed with 
some implementation plan for this chapter and proceed with some test 
cases. Therefore, we do not as yet have any reports236 as stated in section 
18 (7)(d) NEMA.”237 So the question arises if, almost 7 years after NEMA 
entered into force, Chapter 4 NEMA is nothing more than waste-paper or 
pretty paper.  
One reason for this situation could be the process behind the 
enactment of NEMA. The analysis of this process reveals that there was a 
two and a half year period during which national policy was being 
developed which included at least three occasions when the general public 
were invited to submit comments on draft or discussion documents.238 
From then on everything moved very quickly, perhaps too quickly. The 
publication of the draft NEMA Bill came barely one month after the 
publication of the final policy document. The public was then given just 
over three weeks to make comment on this draft. It is difficult to 
understand why, in contrast to the public involvement in the policy 
development process, the public was given such a short time to make 
comments on the draft.239 It is obvious that scrutinising proposed 
legislation is far more difficult than perusing policy documents. The 
commentators do not give any explanation for the rush to the end of the 
procedure. In my opinion one explanation could be that those in control of 
the process were determined to have the Act passed without delay since 
the Constitution and its environmental provisions were already in force. 
Maybe they feared that a delay would increase the uncertainty among the 
population with regard to the fundamental environmental rights granted 
by s 24 of the Constitution. 
Then, to make matters worse, the NCOP, which considered making 
substantive submissions on the Bill, was persuaded not to amend the draft 
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because these amendments would result in a delay of at least six months 
before the Act was passed.240 It is understandable that one admires the 
wish to have such an important Act coming into effect as soon as possible 
but not at any price. One can only guess whether a longer time to make 
submissions would have changed something with regard to the 
implementation of Chapter 4. However, in the next paragraphs I show on 
the basis of two cases how mediation has been used recently in South 
Africa to resolve environmental disputes. 
D.3 Processes in South Africa which involve environmental 
mediation 
 
Although the DEAT national office is still working on the 
implementation of Chapter 4 NEMA, mediation as a generic process has in 
general already been used several times in South Africa to resolve 
environmental conflicts. In this chapter I examine two cases in which 
environmental mediation was involved to resolve the conflict. This 
examination will involve a case of conflict over industrial effluent disposal 
and of conflict over the establishment of abalone farm on Pringle Cove 
smallholding, Pringle Bay.241 
D.3.1 Environmental mediation in the context of ind ustrial effluent disposal 
D.3.1.1 The origin of the dispute 
 
The marine environment of the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal has 
been a recreational and tourist destination for a long time. Holiday 
makers, divers and fishers have been attracted by the beaches and 
lagoons of this area.242  
Situated at the upper South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal are three large 
companies (AE & CI Ltd, Sappi Saiccor243 and Tioxide SA) which together 
employ around 4000 employees. All three companies discharge industrial 
effluent into the sea via pipelines on the basis of a permit granted by the 
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Department of Water Affairs and Tourism.244 The impact of the discharge of 
the effluent from the pipelines has been the cause of great controversy 
since the 1960s. The presence of foam, discolouration and toxicity have 
caused concern and anger within the local community and the sea users 
and resulted in campaigns, such as a bumper-sticker campaign targeting 
Sappi Saiccor.245  
Heightened tensions and threats of litigation led to the 
establishment of the South Coast Marine Pipeline Forum (SCMPF) in 
August 1995. The group was made up of a range of stakeholders, which 
committed themselves to the joint resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, 
the pending renewal of the Sappi Saiccor permit to discharge industrial 
effluent into the sea in October 1996 provided a strategic moment for the 
establishment of this forum. 246 
D.3.1.2 The process: Stakeholder Workshops 
 
The first steps in the SCMPF process were to identify the 
stakeholders and to organise separate stakeholder workshops in order to 
encourage participation in and commitment to the process. The following 
eight stakeholder groups were finally decided upon by the SCMPF: the 
tourist trade, conservation, government authorities, sea-users, sea-based 
business, the communities at Amanzimtoti and Umkomaas, the three 
companies, and employees of the three companies.247 In a next step the 
representatives of these stakeholder groups were contacted and invited to 
attend the separate workshops.  
The SCMPF requested the Independent Mediation Services of South 
Africa to appoint facilitators for the eight stakeholder workshops. The 
facilitators designed a format for the workshop it identify the interests and 
concerns of the different stakeholders.248  
The purpose of the next step was to ensure the understanding for 
the other groups’ perspectives and to remind the group that the situation 
involved competing interests that required balancing. Therefore the 
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groups were asked to speculate what the interests and concerns of the 
other seven stakeholder groups might be.249  
Thereafter the groups were asked to brainstorm any possible 
solutions. The results of this brainstorming were written on flipcharts. The 
aim of this step was to allow the groups to see that there exists a wide 
range of solutions, everything from closure of the companies to 
unregulated pollution.250  
The last step during these stakeholder workshops was to ask the 
groups to decide what criteria should be used to evaluate the list of 
solutions. The aim of this step was to narrow the range of solution options 
to those perceived by the groups as meeting broad policy aims.  
Finally, two to three representatives from each stakeholder group 
were elected to take the concerns of the group forward to the final 
stakeholder workshop where the representatives of the eight stakeholder 
groups’ were to meet together.251 Each of the representatives who were to 
attend the final multi-stakeholder workshops received a full report on the 
outcome of all the stakeholder workshops. 
D.3.1.3 The process: The Final Workshop 
 
The multi-stakeholder final workshop was held over a full afternoon 
and the following morning. The representatives from all stakeholder 
groups, who had the opportunity to read through the reports of each 
others’ workshops, were asked simply, in a first step, to list their main 
concerns which they felt needed to be addressed.252 Thereafter a draft was 
prepared by the facilitator of what concerns any chosen solution had to 
recognise and the representatives were requested to rework this draft to 
their satisfaction. Through this procedure an agreed text was facilitated 
which read: 253 
“It is agreed by all stakeholders to find a solution which recognises: 
a. the economic and employment interests of stakeholders; 
b. the need for a sustainable marine, coastal and estuarine environment; 
c. the need for transparency, participation and information;  
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d. the need for a timeous solution; 
e. the demonstration of on-going, objective and effective management of 
the environment through regulation and enforcement; 
f. commitment to constructive relationships.” 
This charter of objectives was broad and the next part of the 
procedure was an attempt to test the representatives’ commitment to it 
and to get them to make it concrete in terms of specific action plans. For 
this reason the representatives were divided into three groups reflecting a 
mixture of the different stakeholders.254 The following task was set: 255 
“Referring to the agreed objectives, 
1. List the main (+- 5) consequences if the companies’ permits were 
refused; 
2. List the main (+- 5) consequences if the companies’ permits were 
granted subject to existing conditions (i.e. the status quo); 
3. If the companies’ permit applications were supported by agreed action 
plans to address the problems, specify what these plans would be.” 
When asked to select one of these three scenarios as the most 
desirable, all three groups selected Scenario 3. In other words, the 
representatives agreed that regulation of pollution was the appropriate 
mechanism to meet the agreed charter of objectives. Even though the 
action plans were creative and varied, it was agreed that the SCMPF 
request the Minister to establish a Permit Advisory Panel (PAP) to allow for 
public participation in the permitting process.256 The remit of the PAP would 
be to make recommendations in respect of the conditions pertaining to 
permits, in order to ensure continual improvement of marine effluent. The 
workshop was unable in the time at its disposal to delve into technical 
specifications and so expressed these only in vague terms.257  
A drafting sub-committee was established at the workshop. Its 
remit was to synthesise the overlapping action plans proposed by the 
three working groups and to produce a consolidated report for 
consideration by the next meeting of the Pipeline Forum. This consolidated 
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report was submitted to the Minister early enough to be considered in the 
procedure of the renewal of Sappi Saiccor’s permit to discharge effluent 
into the sea.258  
The report proposed firstly that the guiding principles agreed upon 
by all stakeholders be accepted as a framework for determining the 
solutions to marine pollution. Secondly, it was proposed that the existing 
permits issued to the 3 companies were unacceptable, and that only a 
short-term interim permit should be granted to Sappi Saiccor and that it 
should be subject to specific conditions to improve effluent quality and 
lead to some relief in the short term. It was also agreed that a mechanism 
needs to be put in place to achieve a long term-sustainable solution.259 The 
mechanism proposed to achieve this long term improvement in effluent 
quality is the PAP. The stakeholders envisaged that the objective of the 
PAP would be the continual improvement of effluent; it would monitor 
effluent quality; it would review from time to time the permit conditions 
and compliance and the performance of the industries. The co-ordination 
and facilitation of the PAP would be in the hands of the companies.260 The 
PAP would devise a mechanism for public participation and as such would 
be a transparent mechanism of decision-making and permit 
management.261  
D.3.1.4 The outcome 
 
The Minister of Water Affairs finally granted Sappi Saiccor the 
renewal of their permit in November 1996. The permit was subject to a 
number of conditions. One was that an Environmental Impact Assessment 
be undertaken of the measures proposed by Sappi Saiccor for reducing 
marine pollution. A further condition was that all the industries with 
permits to discharge marine effluent set up PAPs.262  
                                                                                                                                 




260 Because of the proximity of the pipelines, AE & CI Ltd. and Tioxide SA have decided to establish 
one Permit Advisory Panel to deal with the recommendations for both pipelines while Sappi 
Saiccor had its own PAP. 
261 Rycroft, Scott & Robertson, op cit note 242, at 93. 
262 At the time this article was written, only the inaugural meetings of the AE & CI Ltd and Tioxide SA 
(on 5 February 1997) and the inaugural meeting of the Sappi Saiccor Permit Advisory Panel (in 
April 1997) were held. 
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In an attempt to find out if these Permit Advisory Panels still exist, I 
wrote to a member of both the Sappi Saiccor and the AECI and Tioxide SA 
Permit Advisory Panel.263 In her answer from 21 July 2005264 she stated that 
the Sappi Saiccor Permit Advisory Panel is continuing but that the affected 
community (Umkomaas) is now in the eThekweni Municipality governed 
by different municipal regulations. The AE & CI and Tioxide SA Permit 
Advisory Panel, on the other hand, has dissolved. The current system is 
for ad hoc arrangements. Thus whenever a relevant issue arises a 
meeting is called. She also informed me, that the Pipeline Forum (SCMPF) 
also dissolved. She cited two main reasons: Firstly, the Department of 
Water Affairs withdrew funding for the secretariat and secondly, the 
Pipeline Forum had fulfilled its main purpose, the setting up of the two 
Permit Advisory Panels and so the Pipeline Forum no longer played such a 
vital role and there was no need for it to continue. 
D.3.1.5 Observation 
 
In October 1996 the necessary preconditions for a successful 
conflict resolution process over industrial effluent disposal on the South 
Coast of KwaZulu-Natal were given because the renewal of the Sappi 
Saiccor permit to discharge industrial effluent into the sea was pending. 
Thus, a balance of power among the involved parties existed.  
The pending renewal of the government permission was, in my 
opinion, the main reason and motivation for all the stakeholders to work 
together to attempt to resolve the matter. In addition the conflict 
resolution process was very well structured and there was broad public 
involvement. The big effort in the separate stakeholder workshops to 
understand the other parties’ interests and positions was an optimal 
preparation for a successful multi-stakeholder final workshop. 
Furthermore all of the representatives received a full report on the 
outcome of all the stakeholders workshops and they had enough time to 
study these reports and to prepare themselves for the multi-stakeholder 
final workshop. After looking for common grounds among the 
stakeholders in the beginning of the multi-stakeholder process the parties 
                                                
263 Email from 19 July 2005 to Dianne Scott (Programme Director: Geography and Environmental 
Management School of Environmental Science, University of Kwazulu-Natal). 
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agreed on the establishment of a Permit Advisory Panel. All stakeholders 
were represented in this panel and the remit of the PAP was to make 
recommendations in respect of the conditions for the pending permit to 
discharge industrial effluent into the sea and to guarantee a long term 
improvement in effluent quality. 
The success of this conciliation process depended on different 
reasons. One of them was, in my opinion, the involvement of all the 
affected stakeholders at an early stage of the process. Another one can be 
seen in the establishment of common ground among the stakeholders 
during the process. The establishment of action plans and the PAP to 
ensure continual improvement of effluent and to guarantee long term 
improvement in effluent quality was also very important for the success of 
this process. And last but not least the pending renewal of the permission 
to discharge industrial effluent into the Sea was the trigger for the 
stakeholders commitment to work together and to find a solution. 
This case shows that conciliation was a real alternative in South 
Africa to resolve environmental disputes even before the implementation 
of the statutory conciliation processes envisaged by Chapter four NEMA. 
D.3.2 The abalone farm case 
D.3.2.1 Background to the dispute 
 
 In a letter, dated 5 August 2000, EnviroAfrica an independent 
consultant informed the I & AP’s (Interested and Affected Parties) that the 
Draft Scoping Report for the proposed abalone farm at Pringle Bay had 
been released for public comment and copies had been made available for 
viewing at different venues. Written comment on the Draft Scoping Report 
was required to be addressed to EnviroAfrica by 15 September 2000.265 
 On 3 August 2001 the Mail & Guardian reported that plans to 
develop an abalone farm in a biosphere reserve were meeting with 
opposition. According to the article, a decision by the National and 
Western Cape government to allow an abalone farm in the pristine Pringle 
Bay area, located in the buffer zone of the country’s only United Nations-
recognised biosphere, had triggered strong criticism from local residents 
                                                                                                                                 
264 Email from 21 July 2005, written by Dianne Scott (Email in possession of the author). 
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and environmentalists.266 Both the local residents and the 
environmentalists argued that the proposed farm contravened the 
international agreement to declare the Kogelberg area a biosphere reserve 
and that it would set a precedent for the development of more abalone 
farms on the 65 other coastal plots between Pringle Bay and Betty’s Bay.267 
The Pringle Bay Ratepayers’ Association also strongly opposed the project 
of an abalone farm, particularly because it would lead to an increase in 
heavy traffic in the beach resort.  
 The owners of the proposed abalone farm argued, on the other 
hand, that the group’s concerns were unfounded because an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)268 had been submitted to and 
approved by the Western Cape Department of Environmental and Cultural 
Affairs and Sport. An application for a 15-year mariculture permit for the 
abalone farm had also been approved by the National Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism.269  
 The proposed farm would consist of a pipe into the sea to 
extract seawater tanks and a shed to house a maximum of 25 tonnes of 
abalone, filtration and pumping apparatus, office space, settling tanks, a 
pump-house, seawater ponds, another pipe to return the water to the sea, 
an extension of an internal road and other infrastructure, covering 
approximately 3500m2.270 A key provision of UNESCO’s biosphere 
agreements is that each reserve should contain delineated and legally 
constituted core areas, clearly identified surrounding buffer zones and 
flexible transition zones, such as in residential areas. Biosphere reserves 
can only be maintained and survive if the integrity of these zones is 
preserved.271 In the end, the Kogelberg Biosphere Association (KOBIO) 
conceded that a single abalone farm of limited size and situated within a 
                                                                                                                                 
265 Invitation to comment on the Draft Scoping Report for the proposed Pringle Cove abalone farming, 
written by Charel Bruwer (Consultant EnviroAfrica) on 5 August 2000. 
266 Streek ‘Farming Project Draws Criticism’ http://www.fr.allafrica.com/stories/200108020337.html 
(accessed on 14 April 2005). 
267 Ibid. 
268 EIA is a tool for decision-making that entails a process of identifying, analysing and evaluating the 
positive and negative environmental affects of a proposed development and its alternatives. The 
EIA regulations spell out procedures that must be followed before a decision-making authority 
such as the Western Cape Department of Environmental and Cultural Affairs can consider 
approving scheduled activities that may have a detrimental affect on the environment; see You 
and Environmental Management in Western Cape Cape Nature Conservation 12/1999 at 5. 





buffer zone property would probably not compromise the integrity of the 
adjacent core area. However, the organisation said that a number of 
similar ventures were being planned and that the approval of this 
application would undoubtedly be regarded as a precedent for the 
approval of the applications still in the pipeline.272 
 In the following paragraphs I examine how the parties tried to 
solve the dispute through facilitation/conciliation and why in the end a 
decision by the National and Western Cape Government was necessary. 
D.3.2.2 The trigger of the process273 
 
In a letter to the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
dated 15 August 2000, the Wildlife and Environment Society of South 
Africa (WESSA) requested appointment of a facilitator in terms of s 17(2) 
NEMA, to deal with a disagreement on the process followed in an 
application to establish an abalone farm on Pringle Cove a smallholding in 
Pringle Bay. The Wildlife and Environment Society was writing on behalf of 
a number of organisations, including Betty’s Bay Ratepayers Association, 
Pringle Bay Women’s Club, Friends of Hangklip, Pringel Bay Ratepayers, 
Hangklip Environmental Action Group and the Pringle Bay Residents 
Forum.  
In their letter to the Minister, the disputing party listed the following key 
issues of concern:274 
1. “That relevant and critical information concerning the application 
had not been supplied either prior to or at the one and only public 
meeting that was held on 1 July 2000. That the failure to supply 
such information had compromised both the capacity and 
opportunity of the interested and affected parties to make informed 
decisions and comment. 
2. That the public participation process had lacked fairness and 
transparency. That the sole public meeting had broken down 
irretrievably in the opening stages and that high levels of conflict 
had been displayed. That no attempt had been made to address the 
                                                
272 Ibid. 
273 The information with regard to the background on the facilitation/mediation process come from 
Andy Gubb which represented one of the public organisations (WESSA) in the dispute.  




conflict through further discussion. That several I and AP’s had 
requested that the matter be addressed prior to the release of the 
Draft Scoping Report, but that the request had been ignored. 
3. That the principal consultant had addressed the public meeting in 
an aggressive manner, and that his lack of independence in the 
matter had been evident. That the consultant had expressed a 
dislike of and even opposition to public participation. That the public 
participation consultants had failed to intervene to get the process 
back on track and that the public had been left with a clear 
perception that both the consultants had represented and had acted 
in favor of the developer.” 
The disputing party requested a facilitation/mediation process in terms 
of Chapter 4 NEMA, to assist them to resolve the conflict, and reach 
consensus on a way forward in the matter. 
D.3.2.3 The Process 
 
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism upheld the 
request for facilitation and conciliation and appointed a facilitator in terms 
of s 17(2) NEMA, to conduct meetings of the I & AP’s with the purpose of 
clarifying the issues of concern and identifying options for resolving these 
issues. The Minister informed that the process will be managed by officials 
of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and the 
officials of the provincial Department of Environmental and Cultural Affairs 
and Sport (DECAS). Furthermore he informed that all I & AP’s will be 
contacted shortly with details of the date, time and venue of the 
meeting.275  
D.3.2.3.1 Facilitation Process 
The first meeting took place in Pringle Bay on 24 February 2001. 
Four groups were mainly involved in the process. The four groups were 
the developers276, the public organisations277, the representative of KOBIO278 
and the Government. Bill Thomson was appointed as facilitator. The 
facilitator explained at the beginning the process that the facilitation 
                                                
275 Letter of the Minister of environmental affairs and tourism (15 December 2000). 
276 The group of the developers consisted of the applicants and the consultants. 
277 The group of the public organisations consisted of eight civil and environmental organisations. 
278 Koegelberg Biosphere. 
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would follow. He referred to the agenda stating that the purpose of the 
meeting was to list/clarify/structure the issues of concern/in dispute, and 
to explore/agree options for the resolution of the issues of concern/in 
dispute.279 
 In a first step the groups were asked to establish some ground 
rules for the meeting (i.e. keep discussion to current points, one person to 
speak at a time, discussion/debate to be around process and not content 
etc.).280 
The role of government observers was then briefly discussed. One 
of the representatives281 of the Government said that the facilitation was a 
first time process for Government and that they had hoped to learn from 
it. She said that Government would gladly and willingly give information 
to the group and that Government was not there in a participant capacity 
but had a responsibility to ensure that the facilitation process took place in 
terms of NEMA.282 The representative of the Government then took the 
parties through NEMA, and told them what the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism was doing to give effect to Chapter 4 
of NEMA.  
She then responded to the specific questions raised in the letter, 
dated 21 February 2001, from WESSA and the other public organisations 
to the facilitator concerning the process. Most of the questions dealt with 
the facilitation and mediation process in a general way.283  
Then the discussion shifted to the consultants of EnviroAfrica which 
drafted the scoping report for the proposed abalone farm on Pringle Cove 
smallholding, Pringle Bay. The representative for the public organisations 
raised the question to the independence of the consultants. He said that 
clarification was needed on the scoping report and that their 
understanding was that the consultant should not give an opinion. The 
facilitator then requested the public organisations to list the issues that 
they believed were in dispute. The public organisations raised their list of 
disputed items. The representative of the Government then said that, 
                                                
279 Record of facilitation meeting held on 24 February 2001 at the Pringle Bay Church Hall at 1. 
280 Ibid., at 2. 
281 There were different representatives of the Government (i.e. DEAT: Law Reform, Planning and 
Conciliation and DEAT: Marine & Coastel Management). 
282 Ibid., at 2. 
283 Ibid., at 4-8. 
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based on the list of disputes raised by the public organisations, she saw 
four key issues being raised by the public organisations.  
The meeting then drifted into dispute resolution mode, as 
participants attempted to deal with the issues that were being raised, and 
to debate them. The facilitator therefore re-clarified that the purpose of 
the facilitation meeting was to list the issues in dispute, and for the 
participants to seek clarity as to the parties’ understanding of the issues 
raised and not debate the merits of the issues or the parties’ positions.284 
After some discussion it was agreed to adjourn so that the public 
organisations could put together a list of the issues in dispute. It was 
agreed that once this had been done the public organisations would 
forward to the facilitator more detailed information in support of the 
points raised on the list and that such additional information then be 
forwarded to the developer party for their response. In the end the 
following nine key points in dispute were identified by the public 
organisations:285 
1. “Identification of I & AP’s: (Disputing how this was handled) 
2. Background information document and scooping report: (Disputing 
the way the process of consultation was handled, and the time 
frames that were given for the submissions. Also disputing that the 
content of submissions were not considered or reflected. 
3. Public meeting: (Disputing the way the public meeting was 
handled). 
4. Draft and final scoping reports: (Disputing the way it was put 
together. Disputing that report was not complete). 
5. Lack of information/supply of adequate information: (Disputing that 
there had been a lack of information throughout the process, and 
that areas of information had been needed in order to be able to 
comment adequately on the scoping report). 
6. Bias/lack of independence and lack of objectivity by the consultant 
resulting in prejudice towards the interested and affected parties: 
(Disputing this point with regard to the whole process, including the 
scoping record). 
                                                




7. Lack of appropriate alternatives offered. 
8. Setting of precedent: (Concern by public that the granting of such 
application would lead to the setting of a precedent for further such 
development. Disputing the fact that this point was not adequately 
addressed in/by the process). 
9. Interpretation and application of EIA process by consultant.” 
The parties then agreed to meet for another facilitation meeting and 
nominated different participants to undertake all necessary steps for the 
second facilitation meeting (i.e. the facilitator was obliged to distribute the 
agreed next steps and points in dispute in paper form no later than 26 
February 2001)286. 
The second facilitation meeting took place on 17 March 2001. The 
facilitator explained that the meeting would be a continuation of the 
meeting held on 24 February 2001, and that the purpose of the meeting 
was to list the issues in dispute, and then to decide whether the dispute 
should be referred to conciliation.287 The discussion then shifted to the 
question whether there had been other applications for the establishment 
of an abalone farm. The representative of the Government said that there 
had been a number of abalone farming applications for other areas.  
The facilitator then asked the public organisations if they had a list 
of the issues in dispute. In a caucus the facilitator met with the public 
organisations to discuss the list of the issues in dispute. When the 
meeting re-convened, the facilitator said that the public organisations had 
listed the points in dispute as being the nine points made at the last 
meeting that were e-mailed to all the participants following the meeting.288 
The developers then suggested that the public organisations go through 
the points that the developers had listed under the public organisations 
nine points, in response to the information sent to them by the disputing 
party, and decide whether the developer’s attempted understanding of the 
issues could be put under the nine headings. The facilitator then met with 
the public organisations and the developers separately. When the meeting 
re-convened the following was agreed:289 
                                                
286 Ibid., at 13. 
287 Record of facilitation meeting held on 17 March 2001 at the Pringle Bay Church Hall at 2. 
288 Ibid., at 3. 
289 Ibid., at 4. 
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• “that the issues in dispute would be the nine points listed in the 
previous meeting; 
• that the disputing party would put together a single list of the issues in 
dispute, and that such a list would be given to the developers on 23 
March 2001 prior to the conciliation meeting; 
• that the dispute would be referred to mediation; 
• that the mediation meeting would start on 23 March 2001.” 
The discussion then shifted to the mediation process and one 
representative of the public organisations asked what would happen if the 
conciliation process did not resolve all the issues in dispute. The 
representative of the Government referred to the options listed by the 
Minister in his letter from 15 December 2000, namely that either the 
competent authority would make a final decision using the additional 
information that had emerged during the conciliation process; or that the 
parties themselves would have to finance any further conciliation process; 
or that the parties could agree to refer the matter to arbitration in terms 
of section 18(6) NEMA, at their own cost.290 
 Following discussion as to whether government representatives 
should be present at the conciliation, it was agreed that it would be 
important for them to be there as observers of the process as they were 
in the best position to interpret NEMA and to give expert input.291 
 It was agreed that the conciliation meeting would start at 14h00 on 
23 March 2001 and continue until 21h00. The meeting would re-convene 
at 09h00 on 24 March 2001 and continue until 18h00, with the option of 
the parties agreeing to extend to conciliation for up to another two hours. 
Finally, it was stated that what was not agreed at the end of the 
conciliation meeting, would be taken as not agreed, and that the parties 
would then need to decide how to take the process further from that 
point.292 
 
                                                
290 Ibid., at 5. 
291 Ibid., at 6. 
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D.3.2.3.2 Mediation/Conciliation Process 
On 23 March 2001 the parties met for the first conciliation meeting 
under Chapter 4 NEMA. The conciliator explained the conciliation process, 
and the role of joint and side meetings. In addition to adopting the 
ground-rules agreed to at the facilitation meeting on 24 February, a 
further agreed ground rule was added: anything said to the conciliator in a 
side caucus would be treated as confidential. Should the party in such a 
side caucus wish the conciliator to convey information from the side 
caucus to the other party, they would inform the conciliator accordingly.293 
 The conciliator then invited the parties to make opening 
statements. The purpose of this stage of the process was to give each 
party an opportunity to relate their story without interruption. 
 The representative of WESSA said that the public participation 
process had gone off the rails. He said that if the EIA process had been 
run fairly and effectively that WESSA would have accepted the outcome of 
the process. He continued that the communities in the area needed to feel 
that their needs and concerns had been taken into account. He said that it 
was possible to get the process back on track and to get a good 
document, but that some aspects of the EIA process might have to be 
repeated.294 
 The representative of the Hangklip Environmental Action Group 
expressed concerns that the I & AP’s had been disadvantaged in that the 
basic requirements of objectivity and independence had not been met. 
The scoping process had been owned by the consultants and that 
therefore the process had been short cut and had been biased. They were 
not against the abalone farm as such, but that they did not want the 
decision to be made without a proper consideration being given to 
environmental issues.295 
 The representative of the Pringle Bay Ratepayers Association 
(PBRA) said that they were looking at a river/tide of similar such 
applications/developments and that the impact to the area could be 
disastrous.296 
                                                
293 Record of conciliation meeting held on 23 & 24 March 2001 at the Somchem Hall at 2. 
294 Ibid., at 3. 
295 Ibid., at 4. 
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 The representative of the friends of Hangklip said that the process 
has flawed. She said that the consultants had been biased and that the 
Kogelberg Biosphere would be threatened by the development. She said 
that a better EIA needed to be done.297 
 The representative of KOBIO said that KOBIO objected to the 
scoping phase of the EIA and that they wanted it re-done. KOBIO wanted 
an objective document that would help Government to make an objective 
decision. He continued that they wanted UNESCO to be acknowledged in 
the report, because they were dealing with a biosphere and not just a 
small town affair. He said that the application for abalone farming might 
instigate further development along the coast and that this could have 
international implications.298 
 Finally the representative of the Pringles Bay Women’s Club stated 
that they raised concerns specifically to do with dust, noise, employment, 
shacks, dwellings and the increase in traffic.299 
The discussion then shifted to the nine broad categories which had 
been identified by the public organisations in the facilitation process as 
being the key issues in dispute. The public organisations had combined 
and grouped their concerns into one cohesive document. This resulted in a 
24 page document, listing over a hundred different concerns. The 
document was presented to the applicants for response during the 
conciliation meeting. The developers were reluctant to respond to the 
individual issues as listed and wanted to group the issues into three broad 
categories. These categories were:300 
• Process, including community involvement in decision-making and the 
alleged bias in the Scoping Report; 
• Environmental issues, including the setting of precedent and the 
Biosphere Reserve; 
• Neighborhood issues, which included noise, dust, disturbance and 
visual impact. 
The discussion then shifted to the question why the developers did 
not want to respond to the nine points refined by the public organisations. 
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The developers argued that they had gone through the balance of the 
items on the list and that they did not believe it to be a list at all but 
rather a cut and paste exercise as opposed to the original list. They said 
that a mountain of stuff had been written about a few disputed points and 
they therefore proposed to work from the three categories mentioned 
above.301 At this point the meeting broke into side meetings and, the 
conciliator met with the two parties separately. 
 The conciliator summarised the proceedings that had taken place 
during the side meetings as follows:302 
• “The public organisations were of the opinion that the proposed 
approach of the developers would not do justice to the many and 
complex concerns that had been put on the table. They felt that the 
scoping report should be redone. They proposed that a series of 
meetings/workshops be held with members of the public organisations 
for this purpose.  
• The developers were not prepared to redo the scoping report and they 
did not want to hold any further information workshops. They had 
proposed in turn that one or two people from the public organisations 
spend 1 to 2 hours going through the scoping document at the 
conciliation meeting with one representative of the developers and 
indicate where information should either be deleted or added.  
• The public organisations were not in agreement with the above 1 to 2 
hour proposed meeting with one representative of the developers. 
They said that of the nine points in dispute that they could cut them 
down to the point dealing with lack of information/supply of adequate 
information. 
• The next proposal made by the environmental and civic groups was 
that a series of workshops be held around the single category of 
inadequate supply of information. The developers’ response to this was 
the suggestion that the consultant and the representative of WESSA 
should go through the scoping report that afternoon, indicating with a 
highlighter where information should be deleted. Additional information 
for inclusion must have been previously referenced i.e. no new 
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information was acceptable. The process had to be accomplished by 
the end of that afternoon. The developers also demanded that the 
public organisations would agree to relinquish their right to appeal 
against any decision made by DECAS. 
• The public organisations rejected this suggestion. They felt that the 
developers were responding to the public organisations’ genuine 
attempts to seek a way forward by putting less and less 
accommodating and unrealistic proposals on the table.”  
At this point the representative of the public organisations asked 
whether the parties could go to arbitration, if the parties reached 
deadlock. The representative of the Government said that the parties 
under s 19 NEMA could go to arbitration, but that it would be for their own 
cost and that the arbitrator’s decision would be final.303 She also said that 
there would still be the right to appeal if the competent authority maked a 
final decision304 
As the discussion progressed, it appeared as if the parties were 
unable to reach agreement. The process was in danger of being 
deadlocked. The conciliator therefore asked for an adjournment to the 
meeting so that the disputing party could caucus to consider the various 
options that had been discussed. Thanks to the caucus the deadlock could 
be avoided and both parties agreed on the following:305 
• “The flawed final scoping report would be assessed by DECAS for a 
decision on the application 
• All new information that had been submitted by the disputing parties 
during the facilitation and the conciliation process would be submitted 
for equal assessment with the final scoping report. 
• DECAS will hold a hearing where the two parties will be allowed to give 
presentations and where environmental and civic groups may present 
expert opinion, gathered at their expense. This expert opinion will 
cover four areas: The suitability of the area for mariculture; whether 
the impacts of a mariculture industry were acceptable within the buffer 
zone of a Biosphere Reserve; the issue of precedent-setting and 
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whether this is a valid counter argument in the application; and the 
community’s constitutional rights in participating in such a decision-
making process.” 
The authorities agreed to set up a hearing within two weeks of 
receiving the above information, so that the parties would be able to give 
written submission, verbal evidence and make representations. After the 
hearing, the authorities said that they would make a decision on the 
application having taken the above information into consideration. The 
hearing was held on 7 May 2001. 
 On 24 July 2001 the DECAS made a decision on the application for 
the establishment of an abalone farm on Pringle Cove. The DECAS granted 
the developers the authority to establish an abalone farm on Pringle Cove 
small-holding, Pringle Bay. The appeal of the public organisations in terms 
of s 35 of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989, against the decision of 
the DECAS was dismissed by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism on 14 November 2001.306 
D.3.2.4 Observation 
The conciliation process did not resolve the dispute about the 
establishment of an abalone farm on Pringle Cove smallholding, Pringle 
Bay. The attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation had already - in my 
opinion – reached deadlock by the time the parties agreed that the DECAS 
would set up a hearing so that the parties could give written submissions, 
verbal evidence and make representation on each of the issues in dispute. 
At this point the parties gave up the power to reach a binding agreement 
through conciliation since it was apparent after the meeting that in the 
absence of an agreement the statutory authorities and in particular the 
Ministry would make a unilateral decision on the application. 
 Nevertheless, the search for the reasons of the breakdown of the 
conciliation and the reasons seeking a litigated solution remains. In my 
opinion the conciliator, who was the neutral third party involved in the 
facilitation and conciliation process would be in the best position to know 
objectively why the conciliation process failed. I approached the 
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facilitator/conciliator and asked his opinion for the failure of the 
conciliation process. In his email307 the conciliator advanced several 
reasons. He suggested that the party that had “lost” at the hearing, may 
have decided that litigation would be an appropriate next step to realise 
their needs. He also questioned the readiness of the parties to genuinely 
seek a creative solution to the conflict from the beginning of the process. 
The impression of the conciliator was that the parties might have been too 
far apart to find an agreed solution. It could too have been that the 
parties had held on to their positions too tightly, and through these 
positions, that might have been underpinned with interests that they were 
not prepared to trade. The decision to have the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism make the decision for them was the final route 
followed to try to resolve the dispute.  
 There is much to support the reasoning of the conciliator. It seems 
that the conciliation process was introduced too late, at the date where a 
draft scoping report already existed and where the developers had few 
motivation to cooperate with the public organisations and to redo the 
scoping report. Furthermore, it looks like that the government acted in 
collusion with the proposed establishment of an abalone farm because 
they probably feared that the rejection of the proposed abalone farm 
would slow down economic development and prevent the creation of new 
jobs in the area. It seems also that the developers had already grown 
impatient with the dispute before conciliation was attempted. They 
probably thought that with a bit of spin and public participation the 
criticisms could be dissipated. The environmental and public organisations 
were not seen as anything but people with quarrels and concerns rather 
than adult participants in a joint exercise to find common ground. In my 
opinion the developers lacked the acceptance and recognition for the 
other parties issues or interests but without a perception of legitimacy, 
negotiations may never begin.308  
 However, I think the facilitation/conciliation process as such had 
also its positive effects and was most of the time handled well by the 
facilitator/conciliator. The process had clear structures and the 
                                                
307 Email, dated 27 July 2005, written by the conciliator (Email in possession of the author) 
308 See also Moore, op cit note 47, at 188. 
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facilitator/conciliator enjoyed the trust of all the parties. The 
facilitator/conciliator also took several chances to use caucuses to avoid 
deadlock in the facilitation/conciliation procedure. The parties and the 
mediator even established ground rules in the beginning of the procedure 
which was an important step to create respect and common values among 
the parties. But unfortunately the facilitator/conciliator missed the 
opportunity to create common ground among the parties at a later date of 
the procedure.  
Finally one can say that even though the conciliation process did 
not succeed it was a milestone in terms of the decision-making process of 
chapter 4 NEMA. It is therefore an even bigger surprise that since then no 
other conciliation processes in terms of NEMA have taken place. 
D.3.3 Comparison of the two procedures 
One reason for the different outcomes of the procedures can be 
seen in the initial positions of the two cases. The background of the initial 
position of the conflict at the upper South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal has 
been a great controversy over decades. In this case the presence of foam, 
discolouration and toxicity have caused concerns and led to heightened 
tensions within the local community and the sea users. This and the 
pending renewal of one company’s permit to discharge industrial effluent 
into the sea convinced the three companies to agree on the establishment 
of the South Coast Marine Pipeline Forum in August 1995. In the other 
case the controversy was mainly about the ‘possible’ impact of the 
proposed abalone farm on the biosphere reserve. While in the first conflict 
the impact of the disposal on the environment was obviously the impact in 
the second case on the environment could not be predicted yet. Thus, the 
initial positions of the two processes were totally different. 
The owners of the proposed abalone farm missed the opportunity to 
involve the environmentalists and residents at a early date of the process 
and to exempt them from their fear that the proposed abalone farm would 
have an impact on the biosphere reserve and that this case would set a 
precedent for the development of more abalone farms on the other 
coastal plots. By not involving the I & AP’s in the process at a early date 
of the procedure the owners of the proposed abalone farm gave the 
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environmental and civil groups the feeling that they were not seen as 
anything but people with quarrels and concerns rather than adult 
participants in a joint exercise to find common ground. The statement of 
the owners of the proposed abalone farm that the group’s concerns were 
unfounded because an EIA had been submitted to and approved by the 
DECAS shows that the legitimacy of the NGOs has not been accepted at 
all. The draft of the scoping report without the information respectively 
participation of the NGOs turned out to be an insurmountable burden 
during the whole procedure. In contrast to this the I & AP’s in the conflict 
on effluent disposal were already involved at an early date of the 
procedure. 
Another advantage of the procedure at the South Coast of Kwazulu-
Natal was the subdivision of the process in stakeholder workshops and in 
a multi-stakeholder final workshop. The aim of the stakeholder workshops 
was mainly to ensure the understanding for the other groups’ perspectives 
and to remind the group that the situation involved competing interests 
that required balancing. The process on abalone farming lacked such a 
reminder of competing interests that required balancing. And even though 
the aim of the facilitation process was to clarify the issues in concern and 
to identify options for resolving these issues the groups already drifted 
during this phase of the procedure into dispute resolution mode, as they 
attempted to debate the issues that were being raised. 
Another very important step during the procedure at the South 
Coast of Kwazulu-Natal was the creation of common ground among the 
stakeholders at the beginning of the multi-stakeholder final workshop. In 
an attempt to test the stakeholders commitment to the process they were 
asked to select one of three possible scenarios. All stakeholders selected 
the same scenario, they agreed that regulation of pollution was the 
appropriate way to go. There was no such attempt to create common 
ground among the stakeholders during the procedure on the proposed 
abalone farm. In my opinion the facilitator/conciliator missed the 
opportunity to test the parties commitment to the ongoing procedure. He 
missed the opportunity to find out if the developers agreed only on 
abalone farming without restriction, if the NGOs rejected the 
establishment of the abalone farm in the Koegelberg area in general or if 
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both parties agreed on abalone farming under certain conditions. By 
testing the stakeholders he would have had the opportunity to determine 
the commitment of the parties to the procedure at an early date of the 
process and, at best, to create common ground among the parties. 
Finally, the involvement of the authorities in the processes was 
different. In the first case (the one at the South Coast of Kwazulu-Natal) 
the Minister of Water Affairs was only involved on the brink of the 
procedure. In the second case the government played a more important 
role since it was the first dispute under Chapter 4 NEMA. Thus the 
government was involved in a function as observer and adviser. This was 
in my opinion problematic because the owners of the proposed abalone 
farm argued at some point that the NGOs concerns were unfounded 
because the EIA had been submitted to and approved by the Western 
Cape Department of Environmental and Cultural Affairs and Sport. They 
also argued that an application for a mariculture permit for the abalone 
farm had also been approved by the National Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism. With regard to this it was difficult for 
the government to meet the criteria as an independent observer and 
adviser and the question arises if the participation of the government in 
this procedure was nothing more than a bad faith exercise. 
In the end one can say that the initial point of the process at the 
South Coast of Kwazulu-Natal was more promising for a successful 
mediation that the one at the Pringle Bay process. The visible pollution, 
the pending renewal of one company’s permit to discharge industrial 
effluent disposal and the preservation of hundreds of jobs in the area 
cannot be underestimated with regard to the commitment of the parties to 
find a solution. Nevertheless, even if the initial point for a successful 
mediation process was more difficult the parties missed a great 
opportunity to find a solution in the case on the proposed abalone farm. 
They not only missed to profit from the experience of the procedure at the 
South Coast of Kwazulu-Natal but they also lacked from the beginning an 
acceptance and recognition for the other parties issues but without a 




E Remarks and Conclusion 
E.1 Remarks 
 
I want to highlight some of the special features, which distinguish 
environmental mediation in South Africa and Switzerland. A major 
distinction between South Africa and Switzerland with regard to 
environmental mediation lies in the acceptation of this form of 
environmental dispute resolution by the respective legislatures. While 
South Africa recently enacted Chapter 4 NEMA containing a number of 
provisions aimed at providing a mechanism for resolving potential 
environmental conflicts through mediation, Switzerland lacks any 
legislation with regard to mediation as a mechanism to resolve 
environmental disputes. In the Swiss legal system environmental 
mediation remains statutorily neither encouraged nor forbidden. The 
reason for this lack of legislation can surely be seen in the Swiss political 
culture, where consent is important, negotiated solutions and other 
consensus-building mechanisms are widespread. (Environmental) conflicts 
in Switzerland are normally solved through negotiations, ballots, legal 
proceedings, cooperation or professionalisation and last but not least 
through the avoidance of conflicts on controversial matters.309 With regard 
to the existing types of resolution mechanisms one can say that the Swiss 
legislature has little impetus to enact a law similar to the one that exists 
in South Africa. 
Another distinction lies in the available mediation infrastructure in 
South Africa and Switzerland. Switzerland, in contrast to South Africa, as 
a result of the aforementioned other types of resolution mechanisms, 
lacks sufficient mediation infrastructure. As a consequence the country 
also lacks skilled and trained (environmental) mediators. The absence of a 
mediation infrastructure and the lack of skilled mediators in Switzerland 
would make it even more difficult to establish mediation among the 
already existing types of resolution mechanisms. South Africa, on the 
other hand, possesses an extensive mediation infrastructure thanks to the 
establishment of the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa 
                                                
309 Knoepfel, op cit note 53, at 277. 
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(IMSSA) in 1984.310 IMSSA trained mediators and arbitrators in 
employment relations and made their services available to employers and 
employees.311 As a result of the establishment of IMSSA more than 20 
years ago, South Africa possesses many skilled, trained and experienced 
mediators. This is a big advantage for the promotion of mediation to 
resolve environmental disputes.  
Even though Switzerland lacks any legal provisions with regard to 
mediation as an environmental dispute resolution and a sufficient 
mediation structure I have shown, on the basis of several cases, that in 
Switzerland mediation-type activities are nowadays frequently used to 
resolve environmental disputes and that the Swiss decision-making 
system, especially in areas of environmental politics where there is yet 
little participation, would offer a good opportunity for environmental 
mediation procedures. A recent survey of the Swiss experience in 
environmental mediation has showed that the experiences made so far 
with environmental mediation have been assessed as being positive to 
very positive with the reservation “if performed professionally”.312 To 
perform environmental mediation professionally it may be necessary to 
establish a legal basis and to establish a mediation infrastructure. Only 
the future will show if the Swiss political culture is willing to implement 
environmental mediation in its conflict resolution system or if it will stick 
to the existing resolution mechanisms to resolve environmental disputes. 
E.2 Conclusion 
 
Even though there is as yet no established tradition of 
environmental mediation, South Africa has established the necessary 
foundations for the establishment of mediation as a mechanism to resolve 
environmental disputes. Thanks to the IMSSA experience South Africa has 
a wide range of skilled, adequately trained and experienced mediators as 
well as the National Environmental Act 107 of 1998 and its Chapter 4 as a 
legal basis for mediation to resolve environmental disputes. Because of 
the existing mediator expertise the risk of mediation being discredited is 
small.  
                                                
310 Nina, op cit note 195. 
311 Steadman, op cit note 194. 
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Despite the statutory support and the presence of experienced 
mediators environmental mediation as a tool of conflict resolution is not 
seen as a preferred mechanism in South Africa. One reason for this may 
be the fact that the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
(DEAT) has yet not processed a successful case using alternative dispute 
mechanisms as mentioned in Chapter 4 NEMA and that the DEAT is almost 
seven years after the Act was enacted, still working on an implementation 
plan for this chapter. There is no clear indication that the Department 
charged with the responsibility of establishing a mediation service is 
committed to it. It is possible that this Department respectively the 
government of South Africa is concerned that chapter 4 NEMA processes 
would slow down economic development in a country which is already 
affected by a high rate of unemployment. Another reason why it takes the 
Government so long to implement chapter 4 could be that the government 
sees the stakeholder approach which is at the heart of environmental 
mediation as ‘naive green optimism’. Only the future will show if such an 
implementation plan will ever help to establish environmental mediation in 
South Africa as the legislator intended.  
Switzerland, on the other hand, is still struggling to accept 
mediation as an appropriate let alone a necessary mechanism to resolve 
environmental disputes, as its entire political and administrative culture 
and institutions are suffused with numerous negotiation elements and 
mediation-type activities. Therefore, for the present and the immediate 
future, the value of environmental mediation processes is likely to remain 
negligible because, despite extensive potential for conflict the national and 
cantonal authorities provide for forms of negotiation on a more or less 
defined scale. In most instances there is no need for a mediator as there 
are already neutral, negotiation persons who help in the resolution of 
environmental conflicts.313 In many cases a mediation institution would 
probably face rejection, as it would be interpreted as an confession by the 
traditional and new institutions, and also the parties involved in conflict, 
that they are professionally not competent to resolve their disputes.314 
                                                                                                                                 
312 Environmental Mediation in Europe, op cit note 52, at 58. 
313 Weidner, op cit note 65, at 232. 
314 Knoepfel, op cit note 53, at 277. 
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Nevertheless, this Swiss attitudes towards traditional mechanisms 
to resolve environmental disputes will probably also prevent the 
establishment of environmental mediation in areas where environmental 
mediation could provide considerable enrichment to the existing 
mechanism for conflict resolution. This is especially in areas of 
environmental politics where there is little public participation, for 
example the non-governmental implementation of political decisions. In 
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